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Abstract 
This report continues a research stream initiated in 2007 to apply mechanism 
design concepts to the DoD’s acquisition transactions.  Recognizing the central 
importance of private information and incentives, mechanism design reflects the 
decisions made by individuals and institutions based on the information they 
possess and the incentives they face.  The designer chooses the mechanism 
(institutional structure) that promotes the desired outcome (decision or resource 
allocation).   
This research addresses asymmetric information in contract negotiations—
eliciting accurate information from a contractor to determine the most cost-effective 
combination of performance, schedule and cost.  During the final contract 
negotiations, the contractor has the best information about the true cost to deliver a 
product or service with the desired quality and within the proposed schedule, but has 
an incentive to misrepresent this information to obtain more favorable contract 
terms.  This research describes a truth-revealing contract structure that has been 
refined for this specific DoD application and develops a spreadsheet model to 
implement this structure.  The model incorporates a budget constraint and signals 
when the proposed contract parameters might exceed the budget constraint.  It 
adjusts the cost target range so that total costs satisfy the DoD’s budget constraint 
while maintaining truthful revelation properties. 
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I. Introduction 
Information is a critical element in defense acquisition.  Without accurate 
information about costs, schedule and technical performance, and the trade-offs 
between them, it is impossible to determine the optimal investment portfolio in 
defense capabilities or to select the most efficient contractors to deliver those 
capabilities.  Unfortunately, the required information is often private, decentralized 
and asymmetrically distributed across potential contractors and DoD stakeholders.  
In addition, stakeholders in the defense acquisition process have conflicting 
objectives and may have incentives to misrepresent their true information.  One of 
the dilemmas in defense acquisition is how to obtain accurate information from the 
defense contractors, aggregate the information, and appropriately use it in the 
defense acquisition process. 
This report continues a research stream initiated in 2007 to apply mechanism 
design concepts to the DoD’s acquisition transactions.  Mechanism design, as 
depicted in Figure 1, is also referred to as reverse game theory (Milgrom, 2004; 
Meyerson, 2008).  Mechanism design models the decisions made by actors 
(individuals and institutions) based on the information they possess and the 
incentives they face.  Recognizing the central importance of private information and 
incentives, the mechanism designer chooses the mechanism (institutional structure 
or game) in a way that promotes the desired outcome (decision or resource 
allocation).  In contrast, game theory treats the institutions as inherited and then 
models the resulting decisions and outcomes.  Mechanism-design situations are 
resolved by motivating the actors to directly or indirectly reveal their private 
information, allowing the decision-maker to allocate resources appropriately. 
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Figure 1. Mechanism Design or Reverse Game Theory 
Recent research into mechanism design has considered situations involving 
asymmetric information and incompatible incentives.  This research has addressed 
incentive contracts as well as market and non-market interactions, including auction 
designs.  The common thread in this research is addressing issues involving 
information asymmetries and incompatible incentives across stakeholders 
interacting to accomplish a particular task, e.g., procurement of a defense 
technology or service. 
These information issues involve at least three elements.  The first element 
relates to gathering accurate information from potential defense contractors.  
Contractors possess private information about their true expected costs and their 
ability to achieve the government’s perceived priorities between cost, performance 
and schedule.  As stated above, it is often in the contractors’ best interest to be less 
than candid about that information, often at the DoD’s expense; the DoD would like 
to obtain accurate information from these contractors.  As the DoD obtains 
information from the private sector, the second information-related issue involves 
aggregating that information is a useful manner.  In contracting, for example, it would 
help to aggregate the available information about cost, performance and schedule 
tradeoffs before publishing a formal request for proposals (RFP).  That way, the RFP 
would be informed by comprehensive and accurate information.  As the third 
information-related issue, the DoD must decide if they want to reveal all of the 
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information they possess.  Just as with the contractors, the DoD might choose to 
strategically reveal information to further their own objectives, often at the 
contractors’ expense. 
To illustrate further, consider three situations where information is critical but 
problematic. 
 Suppose the DoD is purchasing a weapon system that involves 
multiple performance characteristics but is uncertain about the relevant 
tradeoffs between the technical performance for each attribute, project 
schedule and cost.  Contractors have better information about these 
tradeoffs but each contractor has a different comparative advantage 
(each contractor is better at delivering different combinations of 
performance, time and cost); their incentive is to sway the DoD’s 
preferences in ways that favor their comparative advantage.  How 
does the DoD gather and aggregate accurate information about the 
possible tradeoffs between technical performance, cost and schedule? 
 Suppose the DoD is negotiating a final contract with the winning bidder 
after a competitive selection process.  At this stage, the contractor has 
the best information about the true cost to deliver the product or 
service within the proposed schedule but may have an incentive to 
misrepresent this information to obtain more favorable contract terms.  
How does the DoD obtain accurate information from the contractor to 
determine the most cost-effective combination of performance, 
schedule and cost? 
 Suppose the DoD is purchasing a weapon system that involves 
multiple performance characteristics and knows its preferences over 
the relevant tradeoffs between the technical performance for each 
attribute, project schedule and cost.  However, the DoD is reluctant to 
be too specific about how it will weight each attribute in the RFP 
process for fear of potential contractor protests.  Without specific 
tradeoff information, contractors may propose suboptimal contract 
outcomes.  How should the DoD evaluate the benefits of more 
accurate information versus the increased risk of protests? 
Previous research examined the use of reverse auctions in the DoD’s 
procurement process and developed a two-stage auction mechanism to gather and 
aggregate truthful information from potential defense contractors about cost, 
schedule and performance tradeoffs, the first information-asymmetry scenario 
described above.  This report will examine the second information-asymmetry 
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scenario: eliciting truthful cost estimates from contractors during contract 
negotiations.  Future research will address the third information-asymmetry scenario:  
the DoD’s decision to accurately reveal its contract preference tradeoffs. 
A. Previous Research 
The economy has developed several mechanisms to govern the interactions 
between buyers and sellers (see Figure 2).1  Traditional markets are most effective 
when there are many potential buyers and sellers and when products are relatively 
standardized.  In traditional markets, competition between both buyers and sellers 
ensures that the market establishes an efficient price to balance supply and 
demand.  Negotiation generally characterizes situations where markets are thin and 
there are few buyers and sellers.  Forward auctions are increasingly used in cases in 
which there is only one seller and several buyers.  This trend is evident with the 
explosion of online auctions, such as e-Bay.  Reverse auctions involve a single 











Figure 2. Alternative Buyer and Seller Interaction Mechanisms 
The Department of Defense (DoD) participates in transactions that involve 
several of these situations.  As a consumer of specialized defense products, the 
DoD operates as single-buyer with anywhere from a single to several potential 
suppliers, depending on the uniqueness of the defense product.  As a consumer of 
                                            
1 A mechanism is the set of rules that govern the interactions between parties in a relationship; in this 
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standard commercial commodities, such as pencils and paper, it participates in 
markets with many buyers and sellers, though the size of defense purchases often 
makes the DoD an atypical consumer in these markets.  As a result, the DoD should 
be expected to exploit the full range of transaction mechanisms, from standard 
market interactions to auctions and bargaining. 
B. Reverse Procurement Auctions 
Prior research described the Defense Department’s experience with 
acquisition auctions, identifying the characteristics of the buyers, sellers and 
products/services exchanged through auctions (Coughlan, Gates & Lamping, 2008).  
As described above, auction theory characterizes reverse auctions as appropriate 
for transactions involving a single buyer and several sellers.  In contrast, the DoD 
practice uses reverse auctions for transactions involving products or services in 
which the government is only one of many potential buyers, including relatively 
standard price-driven commercial commodities and services.  The DoD has 
effectively substituted the reverse auction and support from commercial electronic 
reverse auction (e-RA) providers for the market research federal procurement 
agents conduct when the DoD purchases these items through a more traditional 
procurement process. 
While substantial cost savings are attributed to reverse auctions, it is likely 
that these savings reflect increases in competition from substituting e-RAs for 
traditional market research.  Competition has two effects: it increases the number of 
cost estimates, which increases the probability of finding a lower cost estimate; it 
decreases the sellers’ surplus as competition encourages bids closer to actual costs.  
Data from two e-RA providers, FedBid and USAAVE, indicate that reverse auctions 
significantly increase the number of suppliers bidding on federal contracts compared 
to the contractors contacted through traditional market research.  Data from FedBid 
further emphasizes that potential competition might be significantly greater than this 
because a large number of suppliers are notified about the solicitation, though some 
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choose to submit “no bid” and others are even less active (Coughlan, Gates & 
Lamping, 2008). 
To extend reverse auctions to more traditional applications, where the DoD is 
the only or one of few buyers, will generally require a shift toward basing the winning 
bid on best value as opposed to best price; best value can include price, technical 
factors and past contractor performance, depending on the buyer’s needs and 
preferences.2  The buyer must state whether the award will be based on the lowest 
price or the best value in the solicitation.  Depending on the size and complexity of 
the procurement, the buyer might also provide specific weights for evaluating price, 
technical factors, timeliness, and/or past performance.  Currently, price, delivery 
time, and past performance are the most common factors used by the federal 
agencies. 
USAAVE can support best-value auctions using a two-step, sealed-bidding 
process; sellers submit their technical proposal with all other required information 
(e.g., company qualifications and past performance information) so that the buyer 
can determine if that vendor is a qualified supplier.  Once the evaluation determines 
a vendor is technically acceptable, they are invited to partake in the reverse auction.  
USAAVE also has a weighted value function that is particularly useful in determining 
a best-value award.  Non-price factors are evaluated and assigned a subjective 
adjectival grade in accordance with a predetermined grading scale.  After the 
adjectival rating is assigned to the factors in the vendor’s bid, an overall weighting 
scale is used to calculate a final bid score that is posted with the vendor’s bid.  Both 
the buyer and the vendor who submitted the subject bid are able to see these 
                                            
2 FAR 13.106-2(4): “For acquisitions conducted using […] a method that permits electronic response 
to the solicitation, the contracting officer may—(i) […] identify from all[…] offers received one that is 
suitable to the user, such as the lowest priced brand name product, and quickly screen all lower 
priced quotations or offers based on readily discernible value indicators, such as past performance, 
warranty conditions, and maintenance availability; or (ii) Where an evaluation is based only on price 
and past performance, make an award based on whether the lowest priced of the quotations or offers 
having the highest past performance rating possible represents the best value when compared to any 
lower priced quotation or offer.” 
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weightings, which the agency believes helps to prevent protests (Coughlan, Gates & 
Lamping, 2008; Brown & Ray, 2007).   
FedBid has a similar automated best-value weighting tool, but it is currently 
deactivated because its e-RAs are primarily used for competing price-driven 
commodities in a simplified acquisition scenario.  Delivery schedule is the primary 
factor federal agencies consider when they want to include factors other than price.  
In this case, FedBid encourages vendors to submit multiple bids in which the price 
may be lower for slower delivery times and higher for faster delivery times.  The 
buyer then evaluates and selects the winning bidder by trading off monetary and 
non-monetary factors as accounted for in the solicitation.  The winning bidder may or 
may not be the “lowest” bidder at the conclusion of the auction, depending on the 
best-value determination.   
One complication in using the best-value approach is uncertainty in setting 
the appropriate weighting factors.  The relevant information is generally distributed 
across the defense contractors competing to supply product or service.  This is the 
information aggregation problem discussed above. 
C. The Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) 
Whether procuring a new aircraft, a desktop computer, or even lawn-care 
services, there are generally a wide number of quality dimensions, beyond price 
considerations, over which to measure a product/service offering from a potential 
contractor.  Answering the “what should we procure” question essentially boils down 
to determining which of all the possible quality dimensions should matter and how 
much they should matter. 
For example, determining which type of aircraft to procure is equivalent to 
determining the relative importance of each of a myriad of possible quality 
dimensions such as speed, maneuverability, range, and so on.  In turn, the relative 
importance or “weight” that a procuring organization places on different quality 
dimensions will determine the types of aircraft offered by contractors and the specific 
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aircraft that is ultimately acquired. The relative weight placed on each quality 
dimension also indirectly determines which contractor will ultimately produce the 
aircraft, with the winning contractor generally being the one capable of providing the 
greatest “bang for the buck”—“bang” being specifically measured by the weights 
placed on the various dimensions of quality. 
Even if economists were to generally recognize that determining what should 
be procured is a complex process, it may nonetheless be unclear how the field of 
economics can contribute to our understanding of the issue. After all, why shouldn’t 
analysis in this initial stage of procurement simply be left to engineers, market 
researchers, and others?  The reason, as we shall see, arises from the fact that 
determining precisely what should be procured requires procuring organizations to 
gather and aggregate a broad set of information that meets the following 
requirements: 
 Incomplete—No single actor or organization possesses all of the 
relevant information. The procuring organization may have some 
understanding of its needs but may possess only limited knowledge 
regarding the capabilities of current technology and probably even less 
knowledge about the costs incurred by individual contractors to 
produce this technology. Each individual contractor, on the other hand, 
may have a good understanding of its own cost structure and 
technological capabilities but may possess only limited knowledge 
about the procuring organization’s true needs or about the cost 
structures and technological capabilities of its competitors.  
 Diffuse—The relevant information for determining what should be 
procured is spread across numerous organizations. The full gamut of 
information about needs, costs, and capabilities is spread among the 
procuring organization and all of its potential contractors, which could 
be numerous. A key piece of information about state-of-the-art 
capabilities, for example, could be possessed by only a single 
contractor while another key piece of information could be exclusively 
possessed by a different contractor. Full information aggregation thus 
requires extracting knowledge from a wide number of organizations—a 
formidable undertaking for traditional market research methods. 
 Private—Information possessed by any organization, particularly about 
costs or capabilities, may be known only within that organization and, 
moreover, the organization may have little incentive to truthfully reveal 
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its information. For example, while traditional market research might 
involve asking a contractor how the procuring organization’s needs 
might best be satisfied by existing technology, the contractor has every 
incentive to convince the procuring organization that its needs can best 
be met by technologies in which that particular contractor has a 
comparative cost or capability advantage. Effective information 
aggregation requires the creation of incentives for contractors to 
truthfully reveal their private information. 
In other words, the buyer is not always fully aware of all possible capabilities 
of available technology nor is the buyer fully aware of the precise benefits of these 
capabilities. Similarly, contractors may have better (or at least different) information 
about the capabilities of available technology but may have only an imprecise 
understanding of the benefits of these capabilities for the buyer.  Thus, information 
about the true nature of buyer value is incomplete, diffuse and private. 
In this case, the DoD faces a significant information aggregation challenge in 
determining the optimal mix of product attributes.  Contractors have better 
information about these tradeoffs but each contractor has a different comparative 
advantage (each contractor is better at delivering different combinations of 
performance attributes, time and cost); their incentive is to sway the DoD’s 
preferences in ways that favor their comparative advantage.  How does the DoD 
gather and aggregate accurate information about the possible tradeoffs between 
technical performance attributes, cost and schedule?   
This analysis employed the economic methods of mechanism design to 
develop an iterated procurement auction mechanism which endogenously 
aggregates information and determines what should be procured, how it should be 
procured, from whom it should be procured, and at what price it should be procured.  
The Iterated Information Aggregation Auction (I2A2) is a two-stage auction; in stage 
one, contractors submit preliminary bids based on their prior information about the 
DoD’s preferences and their own performance, schedule and cost tradeoffs (this 
could be considered a pre-qualification stage)  (Coughlan, Gates & Lamping, 2008; 
Vanden Bos, 2007).  The DoD uses the first-stage submissions to update its 
information about the performance, schedule and cost tradeoffs and incorporates 
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that information into its published attribute weights in the final RFP.  The higher-
valued contractors from the first stage are invited to submit final bids in the second 
stage; the lower-valued contractors are eliminated from the competition in stage two. 
Both the first and second auction stages are conducted as generalized, multi-
dimensional, second-price auctions.  This means that the bids will first be ranked 
according to the overall value delivered (as perceived by the DoD).  The winner in 
the final auction is the seller who submits the highest value bid.  The feature that 
makes the auction a generalized second-price auction is that the winning seller in 
the final auction is not paid the price it bid but rather the highest price that the seller 
could have bid and still have won the final auction. 
This generalized second-price auction format is employed because it induces 
truthful revelation of costs.  This well-known characteristic of generalized second-
price auctions in the current context implies that the optimal strategy for any seller is 
to submit a bid in which its price is exactly equal to its cost (including opportunity 
costs or minimum required profits) to deliver a product/service with the performance 
attributes and schedule submitted in its bid. 
While the winning seller will not be announced until after the final auction, it is 
important to note that bids placed in the first-stage auction are considered binding.  If 
a bid placed in the initial auction actually delivers higher overall value to the buyer 
than any bid placed in the final auction, then the buyer can (and will) choose that 
first-stage submission as the ultimate winning bid.  Again, the winning seller will be 
paid the highest price that seller could have bid and still have won the final auction.  
Allowing for a bid placed in the initial auction to be selected as the ultimate winning 
bid encourages bids placed in the initial auction to be truth-revealing as in the 
second round.  If bids in the initial auction were not binding, a seller would have an 
incentive to bid a price below cost to increase its chances of being identified as a 
high-value bidder and participate in the final auction.  With binding initial bids, 
contractors are likely to bid truthfully (setting price equal to cost) (Coughlan, Gates & 
Lamping, 2008; Vanden Bos, 2007). 
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Simulation analysis revealed that the I2A2 mechanism can potentially increase 
the DoD’s surplus value (price minus true value) by 30% or more compared to the 
available single-stage auction alternatives.  Investigating the performance of the I2A2 
mechanism under various competitive and information conditions further showed 
that the mechanism performs comparably well under both high-competition and low-
competition scenarios but appears to be most valuable in environments with 
relatively low information, especially when contractors possess better information 
about the potential value of a product/service than the government buyer (Coughlan, 
Gates & Lamping, 2008) 
D. Current Research 
The research summarized in this report addresses the second asymmetric 
information scenario described above: eliciting accurate information from a 
contractor to determine the most cost-effective combination of performance, 
schedule and cost during final contract negotiations.  During the final contract 
negotiations, the contractor has the best information about the true cost to deliver a 
product or service with the desired quality and within the proposed schedule but may 
have an incentive to misrepresent this information to obtain more favorable contract 
terms.  This research describes a truth-revealing contract structure that has been 
refined for this specific DoD application and develops the contracting guidance to 
implement this structure.  This broadens our research on asymmetric information 
and incompatible incentives to include contracting mechanisms designed for 
situations where auctions are inappropriate or impractical.
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II. Principal-Agent Relationships in Defense 
Contracting 
Contracting situations, such as the one described above, are generally 
characterized as principal-agent relationships.  Principal-agent relationships are 
relatively common situations in both the public and private sectors (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  A principal-agent relationship occurs when one 
organization (the principal) wants to employ another organization (the agent) to 
perform a task or service.  Problems arise in these relationships because the 
principal and agent typically have different objectives.  In addition, both parties have 
incomplete information, and it is usually costly or impossible for the principal to 
perfectly monitor the agent's performance.  As a result, agents can engage in 
strategic behavior to further their objectives at the principal's expense.  
For example, consider the defense procurement process for major systems or 
developmental items (items that are not available off-the-shelf).  The federal 
procurement process, as specified in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, involves 
several steps: selecting the contractor, negotiating the contract, performing the work, 
evaluating the contractor's performance, and giving the contractor the appropriate 
payments.  The procuring agency initiates the process by publishing a Request For 
Proposals (RFP).  The RFP specifies the system's technical requirements, program 
schedule, and any other pertinent information.  All interested private firms are invited 
to respond to the RFPs by submitting a proposal.  The proposal describes the firm's 
technical approach, schedule, projected system performance, and estimated cost.  
After evaluating all proposals, the winning contractor is selected.  Selection criteria 
include technical merit, cost, schedule, managerial approach, and the demonstrated 
capability to perform the task as proposed.  The winning contractor is selected by 
assessing each proposal in all relevant dimensions.  Comparisons necessarily 
involve a degree of subjectivity. 
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After completing the selection process, the procuring organization (principal) 
and the winning contractor (agent) enter negotiations.  During this phase, the 
principal and agent negotiate a contract that specifies the technical objectives, 
program schedule, cost targets, allowable costs and profits, and performance 
evaluation criteria.  The negotiations are certainly influenced by the contractor's 
proposal, but they are not bound by the proposal terms.  After reaching an 
agreement, the work is performed, evaluated, and the appropriate payments are 
made. 
A. Overview of Principal-Agent Problems 
Principal-agent problems arise because both parties have different incentives 
throughout this process.  Presumably, the principal would like to minimize cost for a 
given performance level and program schedule.  The principal may also have other 
objectives such as maximizing the probability that the program is funded, maximizing 
the probability of completing the program within the cost target, maximizing the 
organization's budget, etc.   
On the other hand, the contractor is presumably motivated by profits.  
Because information is incomplete and the principal cannot perfectly monitor or 
evaluate the agent's performance, the agent has an incentive to behave strategically 
to increase profits.  In the process described above, there are several areas where 
strategic behavior can enhance the contractor's profits.  First, the contractor has an 
incentive to be optimistic in the proposal process.  This increases the probability of 
winning the contract but does not irreversibly compromise the agent's negotiating 
position.  Depending on the contract form, the contractor may have an incentive to 
be overly pessimistic during negotiations in order to make the contract terms more 
favorable.  Similarly, the contractor may have an incentive to overstate the level of 
effort applied during the program.  Finally, there is no incentive to control results that 
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Incomplete information and divergent objectives create a sense of mistrust 
between the principal and the agent.  As explained above, agents have an incentive 
to exploit their private information to further their objectives.  Because the principal 
and agent have different objectives, this may not be in the principal's best interest.  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to detect misrepresented or biased information when the 
players have different areas of expertise.  Therefore, it is natural for the principal to 
mistrust the agent's data, reported performance, and management decisions.   
B. Incentive Contracting and Regulatory Mechanisms in 
Principal-Agent Relationships 
There are both exogenous and endogenous responses to this problem.  The 
exogenous response is for the principal to impose performance standards or 
behavior norms on the agent and monitor the agent's behavior for conformance.  
The endogenous response explicitly recognizes the opportunity for strategic 
behavior and counters this incentive through appropriately designed contract 
incentives.  The contract incentives should reflect the principal's circumstances, 
including the information available, the observable variables, and the principal's 
authority.  Endogenously deriving the incentive structure can produce a contract that 
aligns the agent's self-interest with the principal's objectives. 
Defense procurement programs have typically followed the exogenous 
response.  There are strict regulations regarding management oversight, data 
requirements, and independent cost and performance verification (e.g., government 
should-cost analyses, independent testing, Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
analyses, etc.).  These efforts have increased the procurement bureaucracy but 
have not alleviated the fears of deception, as indicated by the continuing stream of 
federal procurement scandals and reforms (Gates, 1989).  In addition, obtaining 
independent information is expensive.  Thus, analysts rely heavily on data provided 
by the organization being evaluated.   
The principal-agent literature on incentive contracting and designing 
regulatory mechanisms recommends an endogenous response (Baron, 1989; Besen 
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& Terasawa, 1987).  This literature describes how the principal can design a 
selection and contracting procedure (or regulatory mechanism) that selects the most 
efficient agent and encourages the agent to act in the principal's best interest.  For 
example, to select the most efficient agent, an endogenously designed contracting 
mechanism must induce the agents to truthfully reveal ex ante their expected costs, 
schedule, and technical performance.  This can be accomplished by structuring the 
contract incentives so that the contractor maximizes its expected profits by telling the 
truth.  In other words, the contract incentives should ensure that the contractor 
maximizes its expected profits by reporting low expected costs if they are low-cost 
contractors and by reporting high expected costs if they are high-cost contractors. 
Similarly, the contract should contain incentives that reward the contractor for 
achieving the principal's objectives.  The principal's objectives might include 
minimizing the cost of achieving the technical performance and schedule targets 
while balancing marginal changes in cost, performance, and schedule according to 
the principal's priorities.  For example, if the contract includes an award fee, the 
relative weight placed on cost, performance, and schedule in calculating the fee 
should reflect the principal's priorities between these factors.  These types of 
"incentive-compatible" relationships are substitutes for monitoring the agent's 
performance and reports. 
Endogenously derived incentive contracts have to balance three sometimes 
contrary factors:  moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk aversion (Besen & 
Terasawa, 1987).  Moral hazard arises when the agent's decisions are not in the 
principal's best interests.  For example, insurance introduces moral hazard because 
the insured may reduce their risk-avoiding behavior (i.e., take fewer precautions than 
the insurance provider would consider optimal).  In contracting, cost-sharing 
introduces moral hazard.  If the principal and agent share deviations from the 
contract cost target, then it reduces the agent's incentive to control cost.  If cost 
deviations are shared 50/50, the agent only captures half of any cost savings.  
Therefore, the agent will only invest in cost-reducing activities if the expected cost 
savings are at least twice as large as the required expenditure.  There is no moral 
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hazard in fixed-price contracts (assuming no renegotiation) while moral hazard is 
most troublesome in 100% cost-reimbursement contracts. 
Adverse selection refers to situations where the selection process 
encourages outcomes that the principal considers unfavorable.  "All you can eat" 
buffets are an example of adverse selection.  As the fixed price increases, 
consumers who eat the least will be the most likely to stop patronizing the 
restaurant.  Therefore, increasing the price increases the cost per customer.  This is 
an unfavorable outcome from the provider's viewpoint.  In contracting, adverse 
selection results if the selection process fails to identify the most efficient supplier.  
Adverse selection is minimized if the principal awards a fixed-price contract to the 
agent with the best proposal and there is no possibility of renegotiating the proposal.  
Under these circumstances, the initial estimates provide a valid indication of the 
actual expected costs.  Adverse selection is more of a problem when the initial cost 
estimate loses validity as with cost-sharing contracts and frequent renegotiation.  
The selection process can be distorted if initial cost estimates are not accurate 
indicators of the contractor's expected costs. 
Risk aversion refers to situations where decision-makers would pay to avoid 
uncertain outcomes.  Risk-averse people buy insurance and would accept less than 
$.50 rather than take a 50/50 chance of receiving $1.00 or $0.  Risk-averse agents 
will demand a premium to undertake a risky activity.  In contracting, where the actual 
costs of fulfilling the contract are uncertain, agents would have to be paid a risk 
premium to accept a fixed-price contract.  As the government agrees to absorb more 
of the cost uncertainty (by increasing the government’s cost-sharing percentage), 
the required risk premium decreases.  The government bears all of the cost risk in 
100% cost-reimbursement contracts, so the risk premium falls to zero. 
Thus, endogenously designed incentive contracts must strike a balance 
between moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk aversion.  The contract design 
problem is further complicated by equity and efficiency considerations.  Equity 
primarily concerns the distribution of income between producers and consumers.  
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Efficiency has at least three dimensions: does the agent use the appropriate input 
mix (capital/labor ratio); does the agent apply the appropriate level of effort; does the 
agent produce an efficient output level (i.e., the level of output produced in a 
perfectly competitive industry)? 
C. Literature Review: Incentive Contracting in Principal-
Agent Relationships 
Simultaneously considering all of these factors in designing selection and 
contracting mechanisms is extremely complex, and it is difficult to discern the impact 
that each factor has on the optimal contract design.  Therefore, the early literature 
typically focuses on specific aspects of the issue, starting with stylized descriptions 
that lead to tractable solutions and gradually adding more complexity. 
In an effort to develop federal mechanisms for regulating natural monopolies, 
Demsetz (1968) provided one of the first attempts to address moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  In his model, Demsetz assumes that there are several potential 
suppliers.  Firms are risk-neutral and each firm knows its own production costs.  The 
regulator knows the market demand.  Demsetz's basic premise is to replace 
competition within the market with competition for the market.  He proposes two 
mechanisms.  In the first mechanism, firms bid for the right to be the monopolist.  
The winning firm is allowed to charge the monopoly price and earn monopoly profits.  
This mechanism selects the most efficient producer and the monopolist uses the 
most efficient production technology.  However, the output level is inefficient.  The 
firm earns monopoly profits by producing less and charging a higher price than 
would be observed in a perfectly competitive industry (though most of the monopoly 
profits are recaptured by the regulator in the bidding process, assuming the 
difference between the first and second most efficient firms is not too large).  
Because the firm has monopoly power, there is no moral hazard problem. 
Demsetz's second mechanism allows firms to compete on the basis of price.  
Firms bid on the price they would charge for their output.  The lowest bid wins and 
the firm has to fill all demand at that price.  This mechanism also selects the most 
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efficient producer and there is no moral hazard.  The output level is between the 
competitive industry and monopoly results, so there is an increase in efficiency.  
However, prices are not responsive to changes in costs, so efficiency is not 
guaranteed if costs are uncertain or if they change over time. 
Loeb and Magat (1979) modified Demsetz’s first approach to ensure an 
efficient level of production.  In particular, firms bid for the right to be the monopoly 
supplier and the winning firm is paid the sum of the producer and consumer surplus.  
This mechanism selects the most efficient firm; there is no moral hazard because 
the firm uses the most efficient combination of resources, and it produces the 
efficient level of output.  Furthermore, if an appropriate auction is used, most of the 
firm's monopoly profits are recaptured through the bidding process (assuming the 
difference between the first and second most efficient firms is not too large). 
Baron and Myerson (1982) modified Loeb and Magat's model to consider 
cases where auctions cannot be used to redistribute income from producers to 
consumers (e.g., there is only one potential supplier or the winning agent has 
already been selected).  The agent would capture all consumer surplus without an 
auction in Loeb and Magat's model.  Baron and Myerson address this equity issue 
by using a two-part pricing mechanism: a per-unit charge and a lump-sum transfer 
payment.  Once the principal and agent agree on a per-unit charge, the agent must 
satisfy all demand at that price.  This determines the value of the producer and 
consumer surplus that is available for redistribution.  The lump-sum transfer 
payment (which can be negative) ensures that the firm earns sufficient profits to 
voluntarily participate in the relationship (individual rationality) and determines the 
final distribution of the surplus between producers and consumers.  The principal's 
(regulator’s) objective is to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and profits, but 
profits are weighted by a scalar that can assume any value between zero and one.  
The optimal distribution depends on the relative weight that the principal attaches to 
consumer and producer surplus.  The model assumes that the principal tends to 
place more emphasis on consumer surplus than on the firm's profits (this can be 
interpreted as either emphasizing consumers over producers or as reflecting the fact 
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that there is a social cost associated with income transfers between consumers and 
producers).   
In this model, the per-unit charge induces the firm to produce the optimal 
output while the transfer induces the firm to truthfully report its marginal costs.  To 
induce truthful reporting, the transfer increases as reported marginal costs decrease.  
This counterbalances the firm's incentive to overstate its marginal cost and mislead 
the principal so that the regulated price is set closer to the monopoly price. 
Assuming that the firm is risk-neutral and has constant marginal costs (which 
are known to the agent but not the principal), Baron and Myerson derive an 
expression for the optimal transfer payment and per unit charge.  If the principal 
places equal value on consumer surplus and profits (i.e., the scalar weight on profits 
is equal to one), the optimal price is equal to the firm's marginal cost.  Because the 
transfer payment ensures truthful revelation, the cost reported by the firm is the 
actual marginal cost.  This is identical to the Loeb and Magat price, ensuring an 
efficient input mix and output level.  The optimal price decreases as profits are 
deemphasized in the principal's objective function.  This results in an inefficient 
output level (reduces the sum of producer and consumer surplus) but increases the 
consumers’ surplus.  Introducing this inefficiency is optimal if the principal places a 
higher value on the consumer.  Thus, the optimal mechanism depends on the 
tradeoff between efficiency and the consumers' gain. 
Laffont and Tirole (1986) consider a single potential supplier, as in Baron and 
Myerson, but the firm is risk-averse.  Risk aversion creates a problem when the firm 
doesn’t know its actual costs ex ante but only knows the cost distribution.  In 
addition, the firm can reduce its expected cost by expending extra effort (effort shifts 
the cost distribution).  Effort reduces the firm's utility.  Furthermore, the principal 
cannot measure the firm's effort.  This creates a moral hazard problem.  The 
principal's objective is to maximize the un-weighted sum of the producer and 
consumer surplus minus the social cost of arranging transfers from the government 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 21 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
to the firm.  The optimal mechanism balances risk aversion, moral hazard, truthful 
revelation, and equity. 
To eliminate moral hazard, the principal can use a fixed-price contract.  The 
firm will apply the optimal cost minimization effort if it captures all the benefits of 
those efforts, as in a fixed-price contract.  However, the firm bears all of the cost risk 
under a fixed-price contract, and it has an incentive to overstate expected costs.  
The only way to get truthful revelation with a fixed-price contract is to give the 
producer the entire producer and consumer surplus, as in Loeb and Magat.  
Unfortunately, this is considered inequitable.  An auction to transfer income from 
producers to consumers is not feasible when there is only one supplier, so equity 
must be addressed through a lump-sum transfer payment, as in Baron and Myerson.  
Transfer payments have a social cost in the Laffont and Tirole model.  Therefore, 
fixed-price contracts successfully address moral hazard but not risk aversion, truthful 
revelation, or equity.   
To address risk aversion, the principal and agent should share deviations 
between predicted and actual costs.  Furthermore, cost sharing can be used to 
induce the firm to truthfully report its expected costs.  The firm has an incentive to 
overstate its expected costs.  To counterbalance this, the cost-sharing rate should 
decrease as the cost estimate increases.  This encourages truthful revelation without 
granting the agent the entire producer and consumer surplus.  Thus, it minimizes the 
transfer payments, and associated social costs, required to achieve an acceptable 
degree of equity.  Unfortunately, cost sharing introduces moral hazard.  Under a 
cost-sharing arrangement, a firm will not apply the optimal effort to minimize costs.  
If costs are not minimized, prices will be inefficiently high and the level of output will 
be below the efficient level. 
Thus, Laffont and Tirole conclude that truthful revelation, risk aversion, and 
the social cost of income transfers imply that a cost-sharing mechanism is optimal.  
The cost-sharing ratio must balance these considerations against the higher costs 
and lower outputs that result from the moral hazard problem.  The exact 
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specification of the cost-sharing mechanism depends on the extent of the firm's risk 
aversion compared to the firm's disutility from cost-reducing efforts. 
Other models have incorporated several additional factors.  McAfee and 
McMillan (1986) modify Laffont and Tirole's model to include adverse selection 
(several potential suppliers) and a predetermined production quantity (inelastic 
demand).  The principal's objective is to minimize the buyer's costs.  Riordan and 
Sappington (1987) modify McAfee and McMillian's model by making the quantity 
demanded increase as price decreases and by limiting the principal's ability to 
accurately observe the agent's actual costs.  Finally, Baron and Besanko (1987), 
among others, consider multi-period relationships.  In a multiperiod relationship, it is 
particularly important to consider the principal's ability to commit, ex ante, to a 
particular mechanism when it may be in the best interest of both parties to 
renegotiate the contract ex post.  The problem with renegotiation is that it alters the 
agent's ex ante incentives and changes the terms of the initial agreement.  The 
principal is generally better off if it is possible to make a firm commitment to the initial 
arrangement and not renegotiate. 
In general, the results in these models follow a similar pattern.  Unit prices 
and transfer payments can be used to induce truthful revelation and to address 
moral hazard, adverse selection, risk aversion, and equity (income distribution).  
However, solutions to these problems are frequently inconsistent with one another, 
and they are generally achieved at the expense of economic efficiency.  The optimal 
mechanism seeks to establish the appropriate balance between all factors, based on 
their relative importance and the principal's objectives.3 
                                            
3For other interesting extensions to this literature, see Baron (1989) and Besen and Terasawa (1987). 
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D. The "Contract Environment" Versus the "Procurement 
Environment" 
The preceding discussion indicates that the optimal contract structure 
depends on the particular circumstances of the relationship in question (the "contract 
environment").  The contract environment is generally dictated by the characteristics 
of the principal, the agent, and the item being procured.  For the most part, it cannot 
be changed.  Characteristics of the contract environment include: the information 
observed—both ex ante and ex post—by the principal and the agent (fixed costs, 
variable costs, level of effort, demand or benefits, etc.), the principal's ability to 
monitor the agent's performance, the principal's and the agent's risk preferences, the 
duration of the relationship (single or multiple periods, one time or recurring), the 
level of competition among agents, and the ability to commit to a particular contract 
eliminating the possibility for renegotiation.  Applying the ideas described in the 
literature on incentive contracting and regulatory mechanism design requires 
understanding the contract environment. 
Applying these ideas to defense procurement processes also requires 
understanding the regulatory or "procurement environment" (i.e., the institutional 
framework surrounding the procurement process).  The procurement environment 
includes the structure of the organizations involved, the decision-makers’ objectives 
and criteria used to evaluate their performance, and the regulations or policies 
governing the process.  For example, different types of federal procurement items 
involve different organizations and are governed by different procurement 
regulations.  Similarly, different private organizations have different 
organizational/institutional structures, performance-evaluation criteria, and 
procurement policies. 
Unlike the contract environment, the procurement environment is not dictated 
by inherent characteristics of the principal, the agent, or the procurement item.  It is 
determined by the principal's institutional practice and generally sanctioned by law or 
institutional tradition.  In most cases, there is substantial resistance to radically 
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changing these institutions.  Therefore, practitioners typically consider the 
procurement environment as a given, with the possible exception of modest 
modifications.  
This can help explain why the literature on incentive contracting and 
regulatory mechanism design has not gained widespread practical application 
despite a wealth of theoretical work.4  Incentive contracting theory generally treats 
the procurement environment as malleable and tailors it to match the contracting 
environment.  Contracting practitioners consider the procurement environment fixed.  
They look at the incentive contracting models and complain that the theory does not 
capture the reality of their environment.  Application failures are essentially failures 
in relating the contracting environment and the procurement environment.  It may be 
necessary to design incentive contracts on a case-by-case basis, considering both 
the contracting and the procurement environment.  Unfortunately, the case-by-case 
nature of these applications makes it difficult to incorporate incentive contracting 
theory into standardized federal procurement regulations or private procurement 
institutions.  Because procurement practitioners tend to rely on standardized 
procedures, it is natural to expect resistance to adopting these theoretical concepts.  
This report attempts to help bridge the gap between theory and practice for at 
least one form of a contracting relationship.  It develops an operational tool, the 
Truth-revealing Incentive Mechanism (TRIM), to help the government obtain more 
accurate cost estimates and control program costs (Pupich & Lewis, 2007).  The 
TRIM is structured so that revealing the true estimated cost offers the contractor the 
highest potential fee for the contracting situation addressed in this research.
                                            
4 Kornhauser (1986) discusses some applications. 
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III. Principal-Agent Relationships in Cost-Plus-
Incentive-Fee Contracts5 
As described above, principal-agent relationships are characterized by 
information asymmetries and incompatible incentives.  Information asymmetries 
involve differences between the principal and agent in the information to which they 
are privy.  In the contracting context, for example, the agent has better information 
than the principal about the cost and time required to deliver the proposed product or 
service.  The principal and agent also have different incentives; the principal wants 
to minimize the cost to deliver the product or service within a time schedule; the 
agent is motivated to maximize profits.  The information asymmetry provides the 
agent some leverage in dealing with the principal; the incompatible incentives 
provide the motivation to exploit that leverage. 
Principal-agent problems exist in most contractual relationships, reflecting 
differences in the principal and agent’s objectives.  This chapter identifies principal-
agent problems in the DoD’s contracting environment and explains how these 
problems enable contractors to engage in strategic behavior to further their 
objectives at the Government’s expense.  Agents can most easily exploit principal-
agent relationships when using cost-reimbursement contracts, so this research 
focuses on cost-reimbursement contracts. 
The Government uses cost-reimbursement contracts when there is a high 
level of uncertainty and the contractor is unwilling to assume risk under a fixed-price 
contract.  In a cost-reimbursement contract, the Government accepts at least some 
of the cost and performance risk by reimbursing the contractor for all allowable costs 
incurred in performing the contract, up to a specified limit, and providing a profit of 
fee in addition to costs.  The contractor agrees to give their “best effort” to achieve 
the contract requirements within the maximum contract price.   
                                            
5 This discussion draws heavily on Pupich and Lewis (2007). 
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There are several types of cost-reimbursement contract structures; the most 
common include Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF), Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) and 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF).  A CPFF contract reimburses the contractor for all 
allowable costs and pays a predetermined, fixed fee for the contractor’s best effort 
contract performance (FAR 16.306).  A CPAF contract ties the contractor’s profits to 
the contractor’s performance in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical 
ingenuity, and cost-effective management. The award fee paid is determined by the 
government’s judgmental evaluation of the contractor’s performance in terms of the 
criteria stated in the contract.  The methodology for determining the award fee is a 
unilateral decision made solely at the government’s discretion (FAR 16.405-2). 
A Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract ties the contractor’s profits to the 
contractor’s performance by an objective, formulaic relationship.  The CPIF contract 
establishes a target fee that is adjusted by a formula based on the relationship 
between actual cost and the target cost.  The contract specifies the target cost, a 
target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula.  After 
contract performance, the contractor’s fee is determined in accordance with the 
formula (FAR 16.405-1).   
This discussion will focus on CPIF contracts with the incentive fee based on 
cost performance, though the incentive fee could extend to other dimensions.  It will 
also focus on negotiation with a single contractor, either as a sole-source provider or 
as the winning contractor from a competitive solicitation process.  Negotiation with a 
sole-source contractor represents a relatively simple case with which to illustrate 
these concepts.  Research has addressed more complicated cases but those results 
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A. Traditional CPIF Contract Structure 
The key elements in structuring a traditional CPIF contract, where the 
incentive is cost-based, are the target cost (i.e., the most likely outcome) and 
associated incentive fee, the cost-sharing rations for cost under- and over-runs, and 
the maximum and minimum allowable fees.  The contractor receives the projected 
nominal incentive fee if actual cost equals the contract’s target cost.  The incentive 
fee falls to its minimum value if actual costs rise to their maximum allowable value; 
the incentive fee is maximized if actual costs fall to their lowest expected value.  The 
contract design must determine the projected nominal target fee (if actual costs 
equal target costs) and the corresponding cost-sharing ratios for cost over-runs and 
under-runs, and the minimum and maximum allowable incentive fees.  The cost-
sharing ratio for cost over-runs (under-runs) is set so that the award fee is minimized 
(maximized) at the maximum (minimum) allowable cost.  Given this contract 
structure, the contractor’s expected profits as a function of actual costs can be 














Figure 3. CPIF Contract Structure 
Frequently, the incentive fee pool is set as a percent of the target cost (e.g., 
10%).  The contract negotiations center on setting the contract’s target cost, target 
incentive fee pool and maximum and minimum allowable costs and fees (or 
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effectively the contract under- and over-run cost-sharing ratios).6  If the incentive fee 
pool increases with the target cost and the cost-sharing ratios are unchanged, as is 
typically the case, the DoD and the contractor have diametrically opposed 
incentives: a higher target cost increases the incentive fee pool and the contractor’s 
chances of hitting the target cost.  As shown in Figure 4, the contractor’s profit 













Figure 4. Asymmetric Incentives with Higher Target Costs 
To formally describe the contracting problem, let: 
CT =  Target Cost, 
CA =  Actual Cost, 
A(C) =  Total Available Incentive Fee as a Function of C,and 
µ(C) =  Cost-sharing Ratio as a Function of C. 
The agent's profits, ∏( CT, CA), are a function of both the target and actual 
costs.  In particular, for costs between the maximum and minimum allowable levels, 
π( CT, CA) = A(CT) + µ(CT)[ CT - CA]. (1) 
                                            
6 For simplicity, the remainder of this discussion will assume that the cost under- and over-run sharing 
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The DoD and the contractor negotiate over CT, A(C), µ(C) and the minimum 
and maximum allowable costs (and fees).  The agent's objective is to select CT so as 
to maximize π( CT, CA).  Clearly, if A(CT) increases with CT and the cost-sharing ratio 
remains the same, the contractor has an incentive to maximize CT.  In this case, the 
principal (the DoD) and the agent (the contractor) have opposing incentives in the 
negotiation; the contractor also has better information about its true expected costs. 
The fact that there is asymmetrical information places the Government in a 
disadvantaged negotiating position.  The Government can determine “should” costs 
for the program by developing internal and independent government cost estimates 
and using historical data from procurement projects of similar in size and complexity.  
The contractor can more accurately estimate “expected” costs, reflecting the 
contractor’s best cost estimate considering the quantity and quality of resources the 
contractor expects to devote to the program.  Only the contractor knows if the 
contract’s negotiated cost is efficient.  The Government currently counters this 
asymmetric information using Government subject-matter experts to evaluate the 
contractor’s proposal, in terms of both effort and cost, without knowing the 
contractor’s true information. The contractor’s proposed cost and the contractor’s 
actual cost can be two very different values. 
B. An Alternative CPIF Structure 
Developing a revised award scheme for this procurement can be thought of 
as a two-step process: setting the appropriate target cost and then structuring the 
incentive fees so that the agent's decisions reflect the principal's priorities.  Each will 
be discussed in turn. 
To maximize the award fee's impact, the target cost should be related to the 
project's true expected cost.  Too high of a cost target would not encourage the 
contractor to seek more efficient approaches; too low of a cost target would 
essentially guarantee that the contractor would exceed the upper cost limit, making 
the cost incentive virtually meaningless.  Presumably, the agent has better 
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information than the principal about the true expected cost.  Therefore, the principal 
should not set the target cost; the agent should select it. 
The principal should provide the agent with a menu of contracts, each with a 
different target cost and award structure, and let the agent choose the most suitable 
target cost.  However, in developing the menu of contracts, the principal should 
structure the incentive fees so that the agent picks the contract that most closely 
reflects the agent’s true expected cost.  In other words, the award fee structure 
should ensure that the agent maximizes expected profits by choosing a low-cost 
target if expected costs are low and by choosing a high-cost target if expected costs 
are high.  Structuring the contract in this manner encourages the agent to reveal its 
expected cost and allows the principal to appropriately target the cost incentives. 
The Appendix to this report derives two general conditions for an incentive 
structure to ensure the agent will reveal true expected costs.  First, the agent’s 
liability for deviations between actual and target costs should decrease (or at least 
not increase) as the cost target increases.  As the target cost increases, cost under-
runs become more likely; as the target cost decreases, cost over-runs become more 
likely.  If the contractor shares in any cost under-runs or over-runs, there is a natural 
incentive to negotiate a high-cost target.  This natural incentive is at least partially 
mitigated by decreasing the sharing ratio when under-runs are more likely (i.e., when 
the cost target is high) and increasing it when over-runs are more likely (i.e., when 
the cost target is low).   
Second, the total award fee should increase as the cost target decreases.  
This reinforces the incentive not to overestimate expected costs.  However, it is 
important to relate adjustments in the award fee pool to the cost-sharing ratio.  If 
agents overstate costs, they receive a share of the resulting cost under-runs; the 
total award fee should be reduced by an amount exceeding the agent's share of the 
expected cost under-run to counterbalance this incentive.  Similarly, if agents 
understate expected costs, then the award fee increases; the increase in the award 
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fee should be less than the increase in the agent's share of the expected cost over-
run to counterbalance this incentive. 
In this alternative contract structure, incentives are structured so the agent 
earns the highest fee if they choose the contract with a target cost equal to their 
expected costs.  The mathematical relationship between the target fees, target 
costs, and share ratio make the fee lost by over-running the target cost greater than 
the fee gained by selecting a lower target cost.  Reciprocally, the fee gained by 
under-running the target cost is less than the potential fee gained by selecting a 
lower target cost. The relationship between target cost, share ratio, and target fee 
make the contract terms truth-revealing. 
1. Truth-revealing Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) CPIF Contract Structure 
Based on the preceding discussion, a truth-revealing contract incentive 
structure can be developed that encourages the agent to reveal its true expected 
costs.  The key elements in developing this contract structure include the feasible 
range of expected contract costs, the appropriate range of cost-sharing ratios given 
the project’s risk, and the minimum profit required for the agent to voluntarily accept 
the proposed contract (individual rationality).  These elements are illustrated in the 
hypothetical contract menu depicted in Table 1. 
Suppose the Government’s should-cost analysis projects an expected $4.0 
million contract cost, with feasible costs ranging from $2.6 million to $5.4 million.  
The risk inherent in this project suggests the agent should bear between 25% and 
60% of any cost under-runs/over-runs.  Finally, the agent demands a minimum 7.5% 
profit (fee) to accept this contract.  These conditions are reflected in Table 1.  The 
cost target in column 1 ranges from $2.6 million to $5.4 million.  The cost-sharing 
ratio in column 2 ranges from 60% to 25%.  As described above, the higher cost-
sharing ratio is associated with the lower cost target; it is harder to realize cost 
under-runs with lower cost targets so agents should be more generously rewarded.  
Finally, the minimum profit (incentive) fee pool ($300,000), associated with the 
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highest feasible contract cost target, is 7.5% of the cost target to ensure individual 
rationality. 
Table 1. TRIM CPIF Contract Structures 
Cost Target 
($1,000) 
Share Ratio Profit Pool 
($1,000) 
$2,600 0.600 $1,490.0 
$2,800 0.575 $1,372.5 
$3,000 0.550 $1,260.0 
$3,200 0.525 $1,152.5 
$3,400 0.500 $1,050.0 
$3,600 0.475 $952.5 
$3,800 0.450 $860.0 
$4,000 0.425 $772.5 
$4,200 0.400 $690.0 
$4,400 0.375 $612.5 
$4,600 0.350 $540.0 
$4,800 0.325 $472.5 
$5,000 0.300 $410.0 
$5,200 0.275 $352.5 
$5,400 0.25 $300.0 
 
The remaining entries in the profit pool column are computed from this first 
entry as follows: the increase in the profit pool equals the decrease in target cost 
times the average of the two associated cost-sharing ratios.  For example, the award 
fee pool increases by $52,500 as the cost target falls from $5.4 million to $5.2 








Consider the agent’s options given this contract structure.  Suppose the 
agent’s actual costs are $4 million.  If the agent selected the contract with the $4 
million cost target, its incentive fee would equal $772,500.  Instead suppose the 
principal and agent negotiated a higher cost target—$5 million, for example.  In this 
case, the agent would receive $410,000 as its baseline incentive fee, plus 30% of 
any cost under-run.  If actual costs are $4.0 million, then the agent’s share of the 
cost under-run is $300,000 (= 0.3 * $1,000,000).  The agent’s total incentive fee 
would be $710,000 (= $410,000 + $300,000), $62,500 less than the truthful contract 
option.  Instead suppose the agent accepts a lower cost target—$3 million, for 
example.  In this case, the agent would receive $1,260,000 as its baseline incentive 
fee but pay 55% of any cost over-runs.  If actual costs are $4.0 million, the agent’s 
share of the cost over-run is $550,000 (= 0.55 * $1,000,000).  The agent’s total 
incentive fee would be $710,000 (= $1,260,000 - $550,000), again $62,500 less than 
the truthful contract option. 
Adopting the contract structures outlined in Table 1, Figure 5 compares the 
agent's profits as actual costs vary for three different cost targets:  $3, $4, and $5 
million.  If the agent expects actual costs to equal $3 million, then Figure 5 indicates 
that the agent’s profits are highest under the contract with a $3 million cost target.  
The same consistency holds between expected actual costs and the preferable cost 
target if expect costs are $4 or $5 million.  If the agent were offered these three 
contract options, then the $3 million cost target would be preferred if expected actual 
costs were below $3.5 million; the $4 million cost target would be preferred if 
expected actual costs were between $3.5 and $4.5 million; the $5 million cost target 
would be preferred if expected actual costs were above $4.5 million.  Thus, if the 
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agent were offered a choice between these three contract structures, then the 





































































Figure 5. TRIM Contract Structure 
Table 2 below calculates the agent’s profits as expected-actual costs vary for 
each of the TRIM contract options in Table 1.  The agent’s expected-actual costs are 
listed across the top row in Table 2.  The values in each column show the agent’s 
profits for the associated expected-actual cost under each of the contract options in 
Table 1; the contract options are represented by their target cost.  An agent would 
prefer the contract option that offers the largest profits, given the agent’s expected-
actual costs.  As illustrated in Table 2, the target cost for the preferred contract 
                                            
7 With cost uncertainty and risk aversion, the expected cost in which the agent switches from one cost 
target to another would depend on the cost distribution and on the agent's risk preferences. 
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option is equal to the expected-actual costs for all costs depicted ion Table 2.  This 
relationship will hold for any contract menu constructed as described above.  The 
range of profits, and hence the truthful revelation properties, will increase as the 
feasible cost range and/or the cost-sharing ratio range increases. 
Table 2 also illustrates that the TRIM CPIF contract structure maintains the 
same incentives for agent’s to reduce actual costs once they have selected a 
contract option (represented by a target cost).  The incentive fee decreases as 
actual cost increases in any given row of Table 2.  Because the agent shares in any 
cost under-run or over-run, there is an incentive to reduce actual costs.  As with any 
cost reimbursement contract, the agent’s incentive to control actual costs increases 
with the cost-sharing ratio.  The cost-savings incentive is highest under a fixed-price 
contract in which the agent bears the entire burden or any cost over-run and realizes 
the entire benefit of any cost under-run. 
Table 2. TRIM CPIF Agent Profits 
2,600 2,800 3,000 3,200 3,400 3,600 3,800 4,000 4,200 4,400 4,600 4,800 5,000 5,200 5,400
2,600 1,490 1,370 1,250 1,130 1,010 890 770 650 530 410 290 170 50 0 0
2,800 1,488 1,373 1,258 1,143 1,028 913 798 683 568 453 338 223 108 0 0
3,000 1,480 1,370 1,260 1,150 1,040 930 820 710 600 490 380 270 160 50 0
3,200 1,468 1,363 1,258 1,153 1,048 943 838 733 628 523 418 313 208 103 0
3,400 1,450 1,350 1,250 1,150 1,050 950 850 750 650 550 450 350 250 150 50
3,600 1,428 1,333 1,238 1,143 1,048 953 858 763 668 573 478 383 288 193 98
3,800 1,400 1,310 1,220 1,130 1,040 950 860 770 680 590 500 410 320 230 140
4,000 1,368 1,283 1,198 1,113 1,028 943 858 773 688 603 518 433 348 263 178
4,200 1,330 1,250 1,170 1,090 1,010 930 850 770 690 610 530 450 370 290 210
4,400 1,288 1,213 1,138 1,063 988 913 838 763 688 613 538 463 388 313 238
4,600 1,240 1,170 1,100 1,030 960 890 820 750 680 610 540 470 400 330 260
4,800 1,188 1,123 1,058 993 928 863 798 733 668 603 538 473 408 343 278
5,000 1,130 1,070 1,010 950 890 830 770 710 650 590 530 470 410 350 290
5,200 1,068 1,013 958 903 848 793 738 683 628 573 518 463 408 353 298












To summarize, both the principal and agent can potentially gain by offering 
the contractor a choice of truth-revealing contracts.  The agent receives higher 
profits by choosing the contract that most accurately reflects its expected costs.  In 
the above example, a low-cost contractor receives higher profits with a lower cost 
target than it would if it accepted a higher cost target.  Similarly, a high-cost 
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contractor receives higher profits with a higher cost target than it would if it accepted 
a lower cost target.  Offering the properly structured choices ensures consistency 
between the cost target and expected costs.  The principal gains by tailoring the 
contract incentives to the agent's true expected cost.  The agent is induced to reveal 
its true expected cost by choosing from a menu of appropriately structured contracts.  
The agent still faces the same cost-savings incentives as in traditional cost 
reimbursement contracts. 
C. TRIM Benefits in DoD Contracting Applications 
1. More Accurate Cost Estimates 
Because the TRIM is truth-revealing, the Government has better insight into 
the true costs of projects, or at least what the contractor believes to be their true 
costs.  In traditional CPIF contracts, contractors have an incentive to overstate costs 
to increase their award fee pool, if the available budget allows.  TRIM provides the 
Government with accurate cost estimates up front and saves either the time and/or 
money it takes to repeatedly return to the financial coffers for additional funding or 
the excessive costs of an overstated cost target. 
2. Bargaining/Negotiating Costs 
The output of the TRIM is a contract menu from which a contractor chooses 
his preferred contract.  Incentives are configured so the contractor earns a higher 
fee if they reveal the truth. With Government and contractor objectives aligned, the 
scenario becomes win-win and there is no need for long, drawn-out negotiations.  
Negotiations using the TRIM are short and save time. 
3. Information Costs 
TRIM helps minimize information asymmetries during contract negotiation by 
aligning the DoD’s and the contractor’s incentives.  When the contractor has an 
incentive to misstate their proposed costs, the Government must acquire information 
to better understand expected-actual costs. Acquiring cost and pricing information 
from contractors is costly.  TRIM helps minimize the DoD’s need to gather 
information about a program prior to contract award. 
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IV. Summary and Issues for Future Research 
A. Summary 
Principal-agent relationship problems exist in all contractual relationships—
especially cost reimbursement contracts.  Contractor opportunism, such as artificially 
inflating target costs in sole-source contracts and using the “B-Team” to execute a 
contract, are strategic behaviors that contractors can use to further their objectives 
at the Government’s expense. Principal-agent problems contribute to the cost over-
runs that plague DoD procurement.   
This report derives a theoretical approach to address truthful cost revelation 
in sole-source contracts.  It summarizes Pupich and Lewis’ (2007) work to fit this 
theoretical structure into the the DoD contracting environment, creating a bridge 
from theory to application.  This bridge is captured in Pupich and Lewis’ TRIM user’s 
manual, replicated here as Appendix B. 
The theoretical mechanism did not account for the DoD’s budget 
considerations.  A budget constraint was added to the theoretical mechanism to alert 
a contracting officer when there are insufficient funds to award a contract.  The 
theoretical mechanism created a profit pool range based on the economic concept of 
individual rationality.  The minimum profit was selected to ensure the contractor 
would willingly enter into the contract; the maximum fee had no upper bounds since 
it was calculated from the feasible cost range and the cost-sharing ratios.  The 
operational model adds a budget constraint and signals when the proposed contract 
parameters result in total costs exceeding the budget constraint.  It adjusts the cost 
target range so that total costs satisfy the DoD’s budget constraint while maintaining 
TRIM’s truthful revelation properties. 
The operational model also incorporates the DoD Supplement to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (DFAR) guidelines to determine a fair and reasonable fee. 
DFAR 215.404-4 mandates that negotiated cost reimbursement contracts use a 
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structured approach to set a fee that appropriately accounts for the contractor’s risk 
given the proposed work.  The operational model incorporates weighted guidelines to 
determine potential fees.  Using the weighted guidelines should facilitate an 
appropriate fee calculation, reflecting historical profits for projects similar in 
complexity and size as captured by the DoD Form 1547.  The weighted guidelines 
fee is associated with the most likely contract cost target (the mid-point of the cost 
target range).8 
B. Issues for Future Research 
1. Risk Aversion 
TRIM can be used in negotiating sole-source, cost-plus-award fee/incentive 
fee (CPAF/IF) contracts to combat principal-agent problems by aligning contractor 
and Government objectives.  Cost-reimbursement contracts are typically used when 
there are significant contract uncertainties, including development and design work.  
The government is generally considered more capable of bearing the risk of 
significant contract uncertainties; contractors would require substantial risk 
premiums to bear these risks (FAR). 
The analysis presented here assumed that agents (contractors) are risk-
neutral.  If contractors are risk-averse and cost-reimbursement contracts are used in 
situations with significant program risk, then it is important to explore the impact of 
risk aversion and its affect on TRIM contract selection.  Risk aversion and the risk 
associated with a particular DoD program could affect the preferred cost-sharing 
ratios and may suggest asymmetries in the sharing ration for cost under- and over-
runs. 
                                            
8 For further discussion of these and other adaptations, see Pupich and Lewis (2007). 
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2. Test and Implement the Mechanism 
The next logical step in this research is to beta test the mechanism using 
experimental economics to replicate a mock negotiation situation.  Experimental 
economics would allow the research to control the participants’ incentives, isolate 
the impacts of the TRIM contract design and explore issues such as agent risk 
aversion.  After completing the experiments and incorporating the resulting lessons 
learned, the next step is to pilot test TRIM in a low-dollar value and short period of 
performance-negotiated contract.   
3. Competitive Contracting Environments 
The current proposed TRIM meets FAR policy guidelines for handling 
negotiated procurements in a sole-source environment.  In a competitive 
procurement, TRIM would need to balance the truth-revelation properties inherent in 
the current model against the incentive to understate costs to increase the 
probability of winning the contract.  The current TRIM model does not address 
competitive procurement.  An operational mechanism design appropriate for a 
competitive procurement environment would significantly broaden TRIM’s 
applicability. 
In summary, TRIM appears to be an interesting approach to reducing the cost 
over-run problems persistent in DoD acquisitions. TRIM addresses principal-agent 
problems more effectively than the DoD’s typical cost-reimbursement contract 
structure.  Although in its infancy, TRIM is ready to move to experimental and pilot 
testing for negotiating and administering CPAF/IF contracts in a sole-source 
environment.  Future research should develop TRIM alternatives that bolster the 
mechanism’s fidelity and broaden its applicability, specifically for risk-averse agents 
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Appendix A.  Truth-revealing Incentive Mechanism 
Derivation 
The contracting problem analyzed here can be described as follows.  A 
principal wants to engage an agent to develop a unique product and supply one unit.  
There is only one potential agent.  The agent is risk-neutral with respect to the 
outcome of this task (this could be satisfied for a risk-averse agent if the task was a 
small enough part of the agent's total business).  Furthermore, the principal can 
perfectly monitor the agent's effort and ex post costs.  However, the principal does 
not know the agent's costs ex ante, only the probability density function over costs.  
On the other hand, the agent does know costs ex ante.  The agent's objective is to 
maximize profits; the principal's objective is to minimize costs.  Finally, due to legal 
and institutional constraints, the principal must use a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract 
(CPIF).  A CPIF contract reimburses the agent for all costs incurred and offers an 
additional award if the agent performs well: the better the agent's performance, the 
higher the award. 
With perfect monitoring and risk neutrality, moral hazard and risk aversion are 
not problems in this relationship.  The primary problem facing the principal is to 
structure the contract incentives to force the agent to reveal its true costs.  If the 
principal knew the agent's costs ex ante, the cost-minimizing contract would pay the 
agent an amount equivalent to his total opportunity costs (actual costs plus the 
minimum acceptable level of profits).  However, the principal does not know the 
agent's costs ex ante.  Therefore, with a CPAF contract, the agent has an incentive 
to overstate expected costs to improve perceived performance and increase profits.   
To counterbalance this incentive, the principal must offer the agent a reward 
for revealing actual costs.  The size of the required reward depends on how valuable 
the information is to both the principal and the agent.  If the agent has low costs, the 
information is valuable to both parties.  Setting the target cost above actual costs 
increases both the principal's costs and the agent's profits; the reward for revealing 
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ex ante that costs are low must be relatively large.  If costs are actually high, the 
information is less valuable to both parties reducing the required reward. 
To formally describe the contracting problem, let: 
Co =  Target Cost, 
Ca =  Actual Cost, 
f(C) =  Principal's Prior Probability Distribution Function over C, 
F(C) =  Principal's Cumulative Probability Distribution over C, 
A(C) =  Total Available Award Fee as a Function of C, and 
µ(C) =  Cost-sharing Ratio as a Function of C. 
The agent's profits, ∏(Co,Ca),  will be a function of both the target and actual costs.  
In particular, 
∏(Co,Ca) = A(Co) + µ(Co)[Co - Ca]. (1) 
The agent's objective is to select Co so as to maximize ∏(Co,Ca).   
Similarly, the principal's objective is to minimize costs.  This is equivalent to 
minimizing the agent's profits because the principal can perfectly monitor ex post 
costs and the agent's effort (profits would be zero if the principal had perfect cost 
information ex ante).  However, the agent must be willing to voluntarily participate in 
the relationship (∏(C) ≥ 0).  This imposes one constraint on the principal's 
minimization problem.  In addition, according to the revelation principal, the principal 
need only consider incentive structures that induce truthful cost revelation 
(∏a(Ca,Ca) ≥ ∏o(Co,Ca) for all Ca and Co).9  This imposes another constraint on 
the principal's minimization problem.  Thus, the principal's objective is to minimize: 
                                            
9 Baron and Myerson (1982) describe the revelation principal in some detail.  Intuitively, for any 
contract that does not induce truthful revelation, a contract can be developed that does induce truthful 
revelation and has an identical outcome to the non-truth-revealing contract.  Thus, any contract that 
does not induce truthful revelation can be replaced by an equivalent truth-revealing contract.  Thus, in 
designing a contract, the principal need only consider truth-revealing contracts.  
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subject to: 
∏a(Ca,Ca) = max ∏o(Co,Ca)  for all C; and (3) 
∏(C) ≥ 0. (4) 
It is possible to show that a contract will satisfy the requirements of truthful 
revelation and voluntary participation if and only if the following three conditions are 
satisfied: 
µ(Co) ≤  µ(Ca)  for Co > Ca;  (5) 
∫+= 1 **)()()( 1
C
C
dCCCACA μ , and (6) 
∏(C1) ≥ 0, where C1 is the highest potential value of C. (7) 
Proof:  First, it is necessary to show that (3) and (4) directly imply (5), (6), and 
(7).  (7) follows directly from (4), leaving only the derivation of (5) and (6).  To see 
(5), consider two possible cost reports Ca and Co.  Truthful revelation, as implied by 
(3), requires that the agent report Ca if that is the true cost and Co if that is the true 
cost.  If Ca is the true cost, then from (3), ∏a(Ca,Ca) ≥ ∏o(Co,Ca).  Plugging the 
definition for profits (1) into this expression yields:   
A(Ca) ≥ A(Co) + µ(Co)[Co - Ca].  
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This can be rewritten as:  
A(Ca) - A(Co) ≥  µ(Co)[Co - Ca]. 
If Co is the true cost, then from (3), ∏o(Co,Co) ≥ ∏a(Ca,Co).  Plugging the definition 
for profits (1) into this expression yields:   
A(Co) ≥ A(Ca) + µ(Ca)[Ca - Co].  
This can be rewritten as: 
A(Ca) - A(Co) ≤  µ(Ca)[Co - Ca]. 
Combining these two expressions yields: 
µ(Co)[Co - Ca] ≤ A(Ca) - A(Co) ≤  µ(Ca)[Co - Ca]. (8) 
This implies (5),  µ(Co) ≤ µ(Ca) for Co ≥Ca.  In other words, the cost-sharing ratio 
must decrease as the target cost increases. 
To derive (6), divide (8) by (Ca - Co) and take the limit as Co  —> Ca.  Using 
L'Hôpital's Rule, truthful revelation would imply that -B(Ca) ≤ A'(Ca) ≤ -B(Ca).  This 
can only hold if  
A'(Ca) = -B(Ca).   (9) 
In other words, if the target cost increases, the total available award fee should be 
reduced by an amount equivalent to the cost-sharing ratio.  Integrating both sides of 
equation (9) yields: 
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dCCdCCA μ .  This can be rewritten as:








dCCdCCA μ .  Solving the integral on the left and rewriting 
implies (6), 





dCCCACA μ . 
It is also necessary to show that (5), (6), and (7) directly imply (3) and (4).  (4) 
follows directly from (6) and (7) because ∏(C1) = A(C1) under truthful revelation and 







dCCCACA μ .  
This is equivalent to A(Ca) except for the limits of integration.  Thus, A(Co) can be 
rewritten as: 
∫−= 0 **)()()( 0
C
Ca
a dCCCACA μ . (10) 
Recall also from (1), that: 
∏(Co,Ca) = A(Co) + µ(Co)[Co - Ca]. 
This can be rewritten as: 
∫+=∏ 0 0000 )()(),(
C
Ca
a dCCCACC μ . 
Substituting (10) into this expression yields:   
[ ] ),()(*,)(*)()(),( 0 00 aaa
C
Ca
aa CCCAwheredCCCCACC ∏=−−=∏ ∫ μμ . (11) 
(3) follows directly from this expression.  When Co > Ca (which implies Co > C*), 
then µ(C*) > µ(Co) by (5).  Therefore, the integrand in (11) is non-negative, which 
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implies ∏(Co,Ca) ≤ ∏ (Ca,Ca).  Conversely, when Co < Ca, then the integrand is 
non-positive.  However, the integral is non-negative because the direction of 
integration is reversed.  Therefore, ∏(Co,Ca) ≤ ∏ (Ca,Ca) still holds in this case.  
Thus, (3) and (4) are implied by (5), (6), and (7). 
If the incentive contract has the properties implied by (5), (6), and (7), then 
the agent will voluntarily participate and truthfully report expected costs.  With 
truthful revelation, the principal's cost minimization problem as stated in (2) can be 
reformulated as minimizing 
∫
C
aaa dCCfCA )()( ,  
subject to: 
∏(C1) = A(C1) ≥ 0. 









⎪⎨⎧ + μ . 
This simplifies to: 
∫+
C
dCCFCCA **)(*)()( 1 μ . 
To minimize this expression while retaining voluntary participation requires that 
A(C1) = 0. 
A and µ can take several possible forms and still satisfy the conditions specified 
here.  Two possibilities are:  
1. A = (C1 - Ca)/S and µ = 1/S, where S is any scalar.   
2. A = eS(C1-Ca) – 1 and µ = SeS(C1-Ca). 
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Appendix B.  The TRIM User’s Guide10 
A. Purpose  
This user’s guide introduces Government-contracting professionals to the 
Truth-revealing Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) and explains how the TRIM can be 
used in negotiating and administering cost-plus-award-fee/incentive-fee (CPAF/IF) 
contracts.  
The TRIM is an economic mechanism, based on principal-agent relationships, 
that uses incentives to align contractors’ interests with those of the Government.  
The TRIM was designed for cost-reimbursement contracts. Specifically, the TRIM is 
intended for CPAF/IF contracts. The mechanism is called “truth revealing” because it 
structures incentives so the contractor will select a contract option that most closely 
reflects their actual expected cost.  In other words, the incentive structure ensures 
the contractor maximizes expected fees by choosing a low-cost target if expected 
costs are low and by choosing a high-cost target if expected costs are high.  
The user’s guide is broken down into three sections.  The first section gives a 
step-by-step explanation on how to use the TRIM.  The second provides a fee pay-
out table to explain how the TRIM incentivizes contractors to reveal their true costs.  
The third explains how to administer the fee on a CPAF/IF contract using the TRIM.  
B. How TRIM Incentivizes Contractors to Truthfully Reveal 
Costs  
Simply put, the TRIM generates a variety of contract options from which a 
contractor can choose. The options provided by the TRIM read like a restaurant 
menu. Each option on the menu has three components listed in the columns: target 
cost, share ratio, and target fee.  Each row on the menu is a contract option 
available to the contractor.  Each row is a packaged deal—the contractor cannot 
                                            
10 This User’s Guide is adapted in its entirety from Pupich and Lewis (2008, December), Appendix A. 
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select a target cost from one row and a share ratio or target fee from another.  Table 
3 is an example of a contract menu established by the TRIM.  The highlighted row 
signifies one of the many options available.  








$31,500 0.600 $5,906 
$32,000 0.568 $5,614 
$32,500 0.536 $5,338 
$33,000 0.504 $5,079 
$33,500 0.471 $4,835 
$34,000 0.439 $4,607 
$34,500 0.407 $4,396 
$35,000 0.375 $4,200 
$35,500 0.343 $4,021 
$36,000 0.311 $3,857 
$36,500 0.279 $3,710 
$37,000 0.246 $3,579 
$37,500 0.214 $3,463 
$38,000 0.182 $3,364 
$38,500 0.150 $3,281 
 
Incentives are structured so the contractor has the potential to earn the 
highest fee if he/she chooses the contract closest to their actual expected costs.  
The TRIM is truth revealing because of the relationship set-up between the target 
cost, share ratio, and the target fee. As the cost target increases, the sharing ratio 
and the target fee decrease.  
Here are a few examples of how the TRIM helps reveal the truth from a 
contractor trying to “game” the system.  Many cost-reimbursement contracts 
establish their target fee as a percentage of target cost.  By establishing target fee 
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as a percentage of cost, a contractor is incentivized to inflate target costs as high as 
possible to gain a larger target fee and reduce risk.  This type of gamesmanship is 
common in sole-source environments where competitive market forces are absent.  
The TRIM combats this strategy by structuring incentives so that choosing a higher 
target cost leads to a lower target fee. The TRIM also decreases the contractor 
share ratio as target costs increase so that the under-run incentive becomes less 
enticing.  
Another example of contractors trying to game the system is when a 
contractor “buys-in” to increase their chance of winning a contract.  A contractor 
buys-in on a contract when they propose a target cost lower than their estimated 
true cost.  At first glance, Table 3 gives the impression that it’s lucrative for a 
contractor to buy-in: the target fee increases as the target cost decreases.  However, 
in this case, it is the share ratio’s function of the mechanism that incentivizes the 
contractor to reveal true cost.  The lower the target cost, the higher the share ratio.  
A higher share ratio creates a stronger incentive for not exceeding target cost. As a 
result of buying-in, the contractor is bound by the chosen option’s share ratio that 
decreases the resulting fee at a rate faster than the contractor’s estimated true cost 
option not chosen. Again, through the use of the TRIM, the contractor is incentivized 
to reveal their true costs to potentially receive the highest fee.  
The remainder of this appendix will give step-by-step instructions on entering 
inputs into the TRIM so a menu of contracts can be developed for the contractor.  
1. Target Cost  
The target cost is the first item to enter into the TRIM.  The target cost is 
synonymous with most-likely cost.  The Government should determine the most-
likely cost by taking the following cost estimates and information into consideration: 
market research data, historical cost data, the selected contractor’s proposed target 
cost, independent Government cost estimate, and the proposed target costs of other 
contractors in the competitive range.  
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When considering the above mentioned cost estimates, it is important to 
make an “apples-to-apples” comparison by identifying the factors affecting 
comparability (scope, assumptions, terms and conditions, etc.), determining the 
effects of those factors, and adjusting each cost estimate by taking these factors into 
consideration.  Cost data should already be normalized during the source selection 
when comparing proposals in choosing the best-value contractor. Using the 
normalized cost estimates, the average target cost value is entered into the target 
cost cell of the TRIM. Figure 6 gives an example of $35,000 being entered as the 
target cost.  




Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Target Fee 35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Max Share Ratio 35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Min Share Ratio 35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$         35,000$  0.0% 0.0%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.000 -$         35,000$  0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
35,000$ 0.000 -$          35,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Budget ##########  
Figure 6. Target Cost Input 
Cap ############# 
After entering the target cost into the TRIM, every target cost option available 
on the menu of contracts will be the same.  This will change; all the target costs on 
the contract menu will be the same until the target cost range is entered.  Only the 
target cost value on the menu, highlighted above, will remain the same.  
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2. Target Cost Range  
Target cost range is the second input to enter into the TRIM.  Since the target 
cost estimate entered in step 1 is only a point estimate, it is likely there will be 
variation between the target cost and actual cost.  Consequently, a variance 
percentage must be entered into the TRIM to account for cost variability.  For 
example, if actual costs are expected to fall somewhere within ±10% of the target 
cost, then 10% should be entered into the target cost range (shaded in Figure 7).  
This changes the values in the target cost column of the contract menu, allowing the 
selected contractor to choose a contract that falls within ±10% of the chosen target 
cost.  Figure 7 shows how the 10% cost target range affects target costs on the 
contracts menu.  




Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  31,500$ 0.000 -$          31,500$   0.0% 0.0%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.000 -$          32,000$   0.0% 0.0%
32,500$ 0.000 -$          32,500$   0.0% 0.0%
Target Fee 33,000$ 0.000 -$          33,000$   0.0% 0.0%
Max Share Ratio 33,500$ 0.000 -$          33,500$   0.0% 0.0%
Min Share Ratio 34,000$ 0.000 -$          34,000$   0.0% 0.0%
34,500$ 0.000 -$         34,500$  0.0% 0.0%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.000 -$         35,000$  0.0% 0.0%
35,500$ 0.000 -$          35,500$   0.0% 0.0%
36,000$ 0.000 -$          36,000$   0.0% 0.0%
36,500$ 0.000 -$          36,500$   0.0% 0.0%
37,000$ 0.000 -$          37,000$   0.0% 0.0%
37,500$ 0.000 -$          37,500$   0.0% 0.0%
38,000$ 0.000 -$          38,000$   0.0% 0.0%





Figure 7. Target Cost Range Input 
The original target cost ($35,000) placed in the middle of the contract menu 
acts as an anchor. On the menu, the target cost options located above the original 
target cost decrease linearly until reaching 10% below the original target cost.  
Similarly, the target cost options located below the original target cost increase 
linearly until reaching 10% above your original target cost.  
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When determining the percentage to use for the target cost range, risk of 
current market conditions and performance risk of the contractor should be 
considered. Performance risks can include but are not limited to type and complexity 
of item/service being purchased, contractor past performance in similar efforts, 
availability of historical data, urgency of the requirement, technical maturity of the 
system, and extent and nature of subcontracting (DPAP, 2008). 
3. Target Fee  
The third column in the contracts menu is the target fee.  The target fee is the 
“potential” fee a contractor will earn if schedule and performance requirements are 
met at target cost.  Similar to how a single target cost was used to fill an entire menu 
of target cost options in step 1, a single target fee value is used to determine an entire 
menu of target fee options for the contractor.  The single target fee value is a 
percentage of the target cost determined in step 1.  In determining a fair and reasonable 
target fee percentage, guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation was sought.  
The Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR 15.404-4 Profit) mandates that 
each agency use a structured approach when determining profit or fee for negotiated 
acquisitions that require cost analysis.  The Department of Defense has their own 
structured approach, the weighted guidelines method for determining fair and 
reasonable fee. Instructions for using the weighted guidelines method can be found 
in the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS 
215.40470). This DFARS instruction guides the user in how to fill out the DD Form 
1574, Record of Weighted Guidelines Application.  Completing DD Form 1574 
calculates a fair and reasonable fee percentage to enter into the TRIM (shaded in 
Figure 8). Since the TRIM is used in CPIF contracts, weighted guidelines are not 
mandatory.  The weighted guidelines should only be used as a starting point to find 
a fair and reasonable range for target fees.  The range of fees used in past CPAF 
contracts for similar efforts also provides a point of comparison. 
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Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  31,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 35,700$   12.0% 13.3%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 36,200$   12.0% 13.1%
32,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 36,700$   12.0% 12.9%
Target Fee 12% 33,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 37,200$   12.0% 12.7%
Max Share Ratio 33,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 37,700$   12.0% 12.5%
Min Share Ratio 34,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 38,200$   12.0% 12.4%
34,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 38,700$  12.0% 12.2%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 39,200$  12.0% 12.0%
35,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 39,700$   12.0% 11.8%
36,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 40,200$   12.0% 11.7%
36,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 40,700$   12.0% 11.5%
37,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 41,200$   12.0% 11.4%
37,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 41,700$   12.0% 11.2%
38,000$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 42,200$   12.0% 11.1%
38,500$ 0.000 4,200.00$ 42,700$  12.0% 10.9%
Budget ##########  
Figure 8. Target Fee Input 
Once the target fee percentage has been entered, the TRIM automatically 
multiplies the target fee percentage by the target cost to determine the dollar value 
for the profit pool. In Figure 8, every profit pool option available on the menu of 
contracts is the same.  All profit pool values on the contract menu will be the same 
until the share ratios are entered in the next two steps.  The only profit pool option 
remaining the same will be the middle target fee value on the menu, highlighted in 
Figure 8.  Once minimum and maximum share ratios are entered, TRIM will 
calculate the fee options based on the original target fee, target cost options, and 
share ratios.  
4. Maximum Share Ratio  
In the context of using the TRIM, sharing ratio is defined as the percentage of 
risk assumed by the contractor.  For example, if the sharing ratio is 60%, then the 
contractor assumes 60% of the risk when the target cost deviates from the actual 
cost.  If the contractor performed well, causing the actual cost to be lower than the 
target cost, then the contractor earns 60 cents of every dollar under the target cost.  
Conversely, if the contractor performed poorly, causing actual cost to be higher than 
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the target cost, 60 cents of every dollar over the chosen target cost is deducted from 
the target fee. The maximum share ratio should be determined by considering the 
upper limit of risk that a prudent contractor would be willing to accept on this 
particular contract, given current market conditions.  A point to consider, the closer 
the contractor’s share ratio approaches 100%, the closer the contract mimics a firm 
fixed-price arrangement.  Figure 9 shows how a maximum share ratio of 60% 
(highlighted in yellow) populates the share ratio column as well as alters the profit-
pool column of the contract menu.  Until a minimum share ratio is entered, the TRIM 
assumes the minimum share ratio is zero and populates the share ratio column 
linearly from 60% down to a 0% share ratio. 




Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  31,500$ 0.600 5,775.00$ 37,275$   16.5% 18.3%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.557 5,485.71$ 37,486$   15.7% 17.1%
32,500$ 0.514 5,217.86$ 37,718$   14.9% 16.1%
Target Fee 12% 33,000$ 0.471 4,971.43$ 37,971$   14.2% 15.1%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 33,500$ 0.429 4,746.43$ 38,246$   13.6% 14.2%
Min Share Ratio 34,000$ 0.386 4,542.86$ 38,543$   13.0% 13.4%
34,500$ 0.343 4,360.71$ 38,861$  12.5% 12.6%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.300 4,200.00$ 39,200$  12.0% 12.0%
35,500$ 0.257 4,060.71$ 39,561$   11.6% 11.4%
36,000$ 0.214 3,942.86$ 39,943$   11.3% 11.0%
36,500$ 0.171 3,846.43$ 40,346$   11.0% 10.5%
37,000$ 0.129 3,771.43$ 40,771$   10.8% 10.2%
37,500$ 0.086 3,717.86$ 41,218$   10.6% 9.9%
38,000$ 0.043 3,685.71$ 41,686$   10.5% 9.7%
38,500$ 0.000 3,675.00$ 42,175$  10.5% 9.5%
Budget ##########  
Figure 9. Maximum Share Ratio Input
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5. Minimum Share Ratio  
In the context of using the TRIM, the sharing ratio is defined as the 
percentage of risk assumed by the contractor.  For example, if the sharing ratio was 
15%, then the contractor assumes 15% of the risk the target cost will deviate from 
the actual cost of the contract. If the contractor performs well, resulting in an actual 
cost lower than the target cost, then the contractor earns 15 cents of every dollar of 
the under-run.  Conversely, if the contractor performs poorly, causing the actual cost 
to be higher than the target cost, then 15 cents of every dollar over the chosen target 
cost is deducted from the target fee.  Since share-ratio risk is shifted between the 
contractor and the Government, the minimum share ratio should consider the 
maximum amount of risk the Government is willing to accept on this particular 
contract given current market conditions.  For example, if the Government is willing 
to bear a maximum of 85% of the risk, then the minimum contractor risk should be 
set at 15%. Another point to consider, as the contractor’s share ratio approaches 
zero, the contract mimics a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) arrangement.  Figure 10 
shows how a minimum share ratio of 15% (highlighted) populates the share ratio 
column as well as alters the profit pool column of the contract menu.  After the 
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Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  31,500$ 0.600 5,906.25$ 37,406$   16.9% 18.8%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.568 5,614.29$ 37,614$   16.0% 17.5%
32,500$ 0.536 5,338.39$ 37,838$   15.3% 16.4%
Target Fee 12% 33,000$ 0.504 5,078.57$ 38,079$   14.5% 15.4%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 33,500$ 0.471 4,834.82$ 38,335$   13.8% 14.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 34,000$ 0.439 4,607.14$ 38,607$   13.2% 13.6%
34,500$ 0.407 4,395.54$ 38,896$   12.6% 12.7%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.375 4,200.00$ 39,200$   12.0% 12.0%
35,500$ 0.343 4,020.54$ 39,521$   11.5% 11.3%
36,000$ 0.311 3,857.14$ 39,857$   11.0% 10.7%
36,500$ 0.279 3,709.82$ 40,210$   10.6% 10.2%
37,000$ 0.246 3,578.57$ 40,579$   10.2% 9.7%
37,500$ 0.214 3,463.39$ 40,963$   9.9% 9.2%
38,000$ 0.182 3,364.29$ 41,364$   9.6% 8.9%
38,500$ 0.150 3,281.25$ 41,781$   9.4% 8.5%
Budget ##########  
Figure 10. Minimum Share Ratio Input 
6. Budget  
The final input into the TRIM is budget.  The budget is the dollar amount, 
authorized by Congress, to be expended on this particular procurement.  The budget 
should include both cost and fee. Figure 11 provides guidance for entering the 
budget. In Figure 11, the budget cell is located in the bottom left corner, highlighted 
in yellow. Currently, there is a large placeholder value in the budget cell.  The large 
placeholder ensures the contract menu is not constrained by the budget.  
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Ratio Profit Pool Cost Total
Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$ 31,500$ 0.600 5,906.25$ 37,406$   16.9% 18.8%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.568 5,614.29$ 37,614$   16.0% 17.5%
32,500$ 0.536 5,338.39$ 37,838$   15.3% 16.4%
Target Fee 12% 33,000$ 0.504 5,078.57$ 38,079$   14.5% 15.4%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 33,500$ 0.471 4,834.82$ 38,335$   13.8% 14.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 34,000$ 0.439 4,607.14$ 38,607$   13.2% 13.6%
34,500$ 0.407 4,395.54$ 38,896$  12.6% 12.7%
Target Cost 35,000$ 0.375 4,200.00$ 39,200$  12.0% 12.0%
35,500$ 0.343 4,020.54$ 39,521$   11.5% 11.3%
36,000$ 0.311 3,857.14$ 39,857$   11.0% 10.7%
36,500$ 0.279 3,709.82$ 40,210$   10.6% 10.2%
37,000$ 0.246 3,578.57$ 40,579$   10.2% 9.7%
37,500$ 0.214 3,463.39$ 40,963$   9.9% 9.2%
38,000$ 0.182 3,364.29$ 41,364$   9.6% 8.9%








Figure 11. Budget Input and Budget Constraints 
There are also two important budget numbers shaded in Figure 11, in the 
cost-total column.  The dollar values in the cost total column are the sum of the 
target cost and target fee in that particular row.  The first important budget number 
($39,200) represents the minimum budget required for the contract to have sufficient 
funds at the target cost.  This dollar value is based on the most likely target cost 
estimate ($35,000) and the target fee established using a structured approach 
($4,200).  If the appropriated funding is less than this value, then there is not enough 
money to award a contract.  If a budget value less than this number is entered, the 
TRIM mechanism will not work and an “insufficient funds” warning will result.  
The second number highlighted in the cost total column in Figure 11 
($41,781) represents the minimum budget needed for the TRIM to operate without 
constraints.  This number ($41,781) represents the budget needed to fully fund the 
contract to cover both the target cost at the highest point on the total cost range 
($38,500) and the associated target fee ($3,281). Any dollar value less than this 
number will constrain the TRIM’s ability to offer a contract option at the highest point 
on the total cost range (+10).  If the budget is low enough to constrain the TRIM, a 
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“budget constrained” warning will result.  Under a constrained budget, the upper 
bound of the target cost range is adjusted to the constrained budget and does not 
include the full target cost range that would be included without the budget 
constraint.  While the effectiveness of the TRIM is not reduced, the Government 
budget boundaries clearly limit the contract option choices available to the contractor 
and weaken the incentives for truth revelation.  The option desired by the contractor 
whose expected costs exceed the target cost may not be available if the budget is 
constrained.  The notification of “budget constrained” reveals a restricted 
Government position in offering contract options with a higher target if their expected 
costs exceed the total budget.  Simply put, the Government’s financial boundaries 
are binding when a budget-constrained situation occurs.  
C. Understanding the Fee Payout Table: How TRIM 
Incentivizes Contractors to Truthfully Reveal Costs 
1. Offering the Contract Menu to Contractors  
Once all inputs are entered into the TRIM, the contracts menu is ready for use 
in negotiations with the contractor.  Table 4, which reproduces Table 3, is a 
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1 $31,500 0.600 $5,906 
2 $32,000 0.568 $5,614 
3 $32,500 0.536 $5,338 
4 $33,000 0.504 $5,079 
5 $33,500 0.471 $4,835 
6 $34,000 0.439 $4,607 
7 $34,500 0.407 $4,396 
8 $35,000 0.375 $4,200 
9 $35,500 0.343 $4,021 
10 $36,000 0.311 $3,857 
11 $36,500 0.279 $3,710 
12 $37,000 0.246 $3,579 
13 $37,500 0.214 $3,463 
14 $38,000 0.182 $3,364 
15 $38,500 0.150 $3,281 
 
There are several ways in which the contract menu can be used in 
negotiations with the contractor.  The easiest way to negotiate a contract price is to 
hand the contracts menu over and let the contractor choose a contract option.  
Alternatively, one can choose not to show the contractor the contract menu 
and instead, start negotiating by proposing the target cost option on the menu. If the 
contractor is satisfied with the target cost option, try to incentivize them by offering a 
larger target fee if they can lower their target cost.  For example, if the contractor 
proposes a target cost of $36,000, based on the contract menu in Table 4, offer 
contractor option #10 ($36,000, 0.311, $3,857).  If the contractor agrees to this price, 
then continue to offer a higher fee for a lower target cost (options #9, #8, #7, etc.) 
until the contractor no longer lowers their target cost.  
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On the other hand, if the contractor rejects the original offer, propose another 
contract option more aligned with their desires.  For example, if the contractor 
proposes a target cost of $35,000, based on the contract menu above in Table 4, 
one could respond with option #8 ($35,000, 0.375, $4,200).  If the contractor is 
unsatisfied with the counteroffer because they want a larger target fee ($4,600 is 
ideal for the contractor), then offer the contractor option #6 from the contract menu.  
The negotiation should continue until the contract option that best aligns the 
Government’s desires (lower cost) with the contractor’s desires (higher fee) is found. 
Once again, it is important to require that the contractor choose across a row (i.e., 
they cannot choose the target cost from option #8, a share ratio from option #10, 
and a target fee from option #4.  The contract menu is only truth revealing when the 
contractor chooses options as they are listed across the row.  
2. The Fee Payout Table  
The fee payout table is a tool to help understand that the TRIM is truth 
revealing.  Table 5 is a snapshot of the fee payout table based on the example 
developed throughout the user’s guide. 
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Table 5. TRIM-based Fee Payout Table 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
1 31,500 32,000 32,500 33,000 33,500 34,000 34,500 35,000 35,500 36,000 36,500 37,000 37,500 38,000 38,500
2 31,500 5,906 5,606 5,306 5,006 4,706 4,406 4,106 3,806 3,506 3,206 2,906 2,606 2,306 2,006 1,706
3 32,000 5,898 5,614 5,330 5,046 4,763 4,479 4,195 3,911 3,627 3,343 3,059 2,775 2,491 2,207 1,923
4 32,500 5,874 5,606 5,338 5,071 4,803 4,535 4,267 3,999 3,731 3,463 3,196 2,928 2,660 2,392 2,124
5 33,000 5,834 5,582 5,330 5,079 4,827 4,575 4,323 4,071 3,820 3,568 3,316 3,064 2,813 2,561 2,309
6 33,500 5,778 5,542 5,306 5,071 4,835 4,599 4,363 4,128 3,892 3,656 3,421 3,185 2,949 2,713 2,478
7 34,000 5,705 5,486 5,266 5,046 4,827 4,607 4,388 4,168 3,948 3,729 3,509 3,289 3,070 2,850 2,630
8 34,500 5,617 5,413 5,210 5,006 4,803 4,599 4,396 4,192 3,988 3,785 3,581 3,378 3,174 2,971 2,767
9 35,000 5,513 5,325 5,138 4,950 4,763 4,575 4,388 4,200 4,013 3,825 3,638 3,450 3,263 3,075 2,888
10 35,500 5,392 5,221 5,049 4,878 4,706 4,535 4,363 4,192 4,021 3,849 3,678 3,506 3,335 3,163 2,992
11 36,000 5,255 5,100 4,945 4,789 4,634 4,479 4,323 4,168 4,013 3,857 3,702 3,546 3,391 3,236 3,080
12 36,500 5,103 4,963 4,824 4,685 4,546 4,406 4,267 4,128 3,988 3,849 3,710 3,571 3,431 3,292 3,153
13 37,000 4,934 4,811 4,688 4,564 4,441 4,318 4,195 4,071 3,948 3,825 3,702 3,579 3,455 3,332 3,209
14 37,500 4,749 4,642 4,535 4,428 4,321 4,213 4,106 3,999 3,892 3,785 3,678 3,571 3,463 3,356 3,249
15 38,000 4,548 4,457 4,366 4,275 4,184 4,093 4,002 3,911 3,820 3,729 3,638 3,546 3,455 3,364 3,273












In Table 5, the letters (A-P) represent the columns, and the numbers (1-16) 
represent the rows.  The letters and numbers will be used to identify specific cells in 
explaining this payout table. The values in column A represent the target cost 
options available on the contract menu.  The values in row 1 represent the actual 
contract cost.  The values in cells B2 to P16 represent the potential fees available to 
the contractor given the respective target cost in column A and actual cost in row 1. 
The cells shaded in light blue (the diagonal cells in the range B2 to P16) highlight the 
highest potential fee a contractor can receive for a given actual cost.  
The target fee function is structured such that contractors have the potential 
to receive a higher fee if they choose a lower target cost.  This incentivizes the 
contractor to choose the lowest target cost possible, so long as their estimated 
actual costs are equal to or near the target cost. However, if the contractor knows 
their estimated costs are lower than the target cost, then the share ratios are 
structured so that contractors receive a lower fee by overstating the target cost and 
under-running the target than they would by simply accepting a lower cost target.  At 
the same time, the share ratio incentivizes the contractor to save costs wherever 
possible, once the target cost has been selected, to generate a larger fee from an 
under-run.  The mathematical relationship between the target fees, target costs, and 
share ratio ensure the additional fee gained from the under-run share ratio are lower 
than the increase in target fee from selecting a lower target cost. Reciprocally, the 
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fee lost from sharing the cost of over-running the target are always more than the 
increased target fee from selecting a lower target cost.  
If a contractor could estimate with certainty that their true costs will be 
$34,000 (column G), the contractor earns the highest fee if they choose a target cost 
of $34,000 (cell G7).  Cell G7 is highlighted in blue on the payout table because it is 
the highest fee the contractor can receive for an actual cost of $34,000.  If the 
contractor estimates that their true costs will be $34,000 but decides to choose a 
different target cost, then the fee is not maximized.  For example, suppose a 
contractor with expected costs of $34,000 acts strategically by choosing a higher 
target cost (e.g., $36,000) so they can earn additional fees from an under-run.  The 
fee received in this scenario ($ 4,479, cell G11) is less than the fee received if the 
contractor revealed their true cost ($4,607, cell G7).  On the other hand, if the 
contractor with expected costs of $34,000 acts strategically by choosing a lower 
target cost (e.g., $32,000) because the target fee is larger ($5,614), then the over-
run share ratio will deplete the target fee so it is less ($4,479, cell G3) than the fee 
received if the contractor revealed their true cost ($4,607, cell G7).  
D. Administering a CPAF/IF Contract Fee Using TRIM  
Before using the TRIM to administer fees during contract execution, it is 
important to understand the types of contracts that fit within the TRIM parameters.  
The TRIM is designed for cost reimbursement contracts.  Specifically, the TRIM is 
intended for Cost-plus-award-fee/Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPAF/IF) contracts.  The 
following section explains how to use the TRIM contract menu and payout table to 
calculate the fee awarded to the contractor during CPAF/IF contract performance.  
1. Determining the Target Fee  
The contractor selects their own target fee when they choose a contract 
option from the contract menu.  Once the contractor has chosen their target fee, it is 
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2. Deriving the Award Fee and Incentive Fee from the Target Fee  
Once the contractor has chosen their target fee, the Government must 
determine how much target fee to assign as incentive fee and how much to assign 
as award fee.  The incentive fee is an objective formula that incentivizes the 
contractor to control costs. The award fee is a subjective incentive that a contractor 
may earn, in entirety or in part, during contract performance.  The award fee portion 
of the target fee incentivizes the contractor for performance areas outside of cost 
including quality, schedule, and technical performance.  
It is the contracting officer’s job, in conjunction with the Government-
integrated product team (IPT) and stakeholders of the product/service being 
acquired, to determine how much of the target fee should be dedicated to controlling 
costs and how much should be dedicated to controlling areas other than cost.  Once 
the contracting officer knows these percentages, the contracting officer should enter 
this information into the TRIM to determine the value of the incentive fee and award 
fee.  Figure 12 is a snapshot of both the TRIM contract menu and the administrative 
function that determines the incentive and award fee pools. In this particular 
example, the contractor selected the contract menu option with a target fee of 
$4,607, shaded in yellow, in the profit pool column of the contracts menu.  The 
Government IPT believes cost control is important enough to warrant 40% of the 
overall target fee, so the contracting officer enters 40% into the incentive fee input 
cell and 60% into the award fee input cell.  The input cells are shaded in yellow on 
the left-hand side of Figure 12. After incentive and award fee percentages are 
entered into the TRIM, it automatically determines the dollar values of both the 
incentive and award fee pools. In this example, the potential incentive fee pool 
($1,843) and the potential award fee pools ($2,764) are shaded in yellow at the 
bottom of Figure 12. 
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Profit % of 
Proposed 
Cost Target
Profit % of 
Chosen 
Cost Target
Contractor Proposed Target Cost 35,000.00$  31,500$ 0.600 5,906$  37,406$   16.9% 18.8%
Cost Target Bounds (%) 10% 32,000$ 0.568 5,614$  37,614$   16.0% 17.5%
32,500$ 0.536 5,338$  37,838$   15.3% 16.4%
Target Fee 12% 33,000$ 0.504 5,079$  38,079$   14.5% 15.4%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 33,500$ 0.471 4,835$  38,335$   13.8% 14.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 34,000$ 0.439 4,607$ 38,607$   13.2% 13.6%
34,500$ 0.407 4,396$  38,896$   12.6% 12.7%
35,000$ 0.375 4,200$  39,200$   12.0% 12.0%
35,500$ 0.343 4,021$  39,521$   11.5% 11.3%
36,000$ 0.311 3,857$  39,857$   11.0% 10.7%
36,500$ 0.279 3,710$  40,210$   10.6% 10.2%
37,000$ 0.246 3,579$  40,579$   10.2% 9.7%
37,500$ 0.214 3,463$  40,963$   9.9% 9.2%
38,000$ 0.182 3,364$  41,364$   9.6% 8.9%









5,906$  2,363$ 3,544$ 
Incentive Fee % of Target Fee 40% 5,614$   2,246$ 3,369$  
Award Fee % of Target Fee 60% 5,338$  2,135$ 3,203$ 
5,079$   2,031$ 3,047$  
4,835$   1,934$ 2,901$  
4,607$   1,843$ 2,764$  
4,396$   1,758$ 2,637$  
4,200$   1,680$ 2,520$  
4,021$   1,608$ 2,412$  
3,857$   1,543$ 2,314$  
3,710$   1,484$ 2,226$  
3,579$   1,431$ 2,147$  
3,463$   1,385$ 2,078$  
3,364$   1,346$ 2,019$  
3,281$  1,313$ 1,969$  
Figure 12. TRIM-based Administrative Function 
3. Administering the Incentive Fee  
After dividing the overall contract target fee into an incentive fee pool and an 
award fee pool, they must be kept separate.  The incentive fee pool and the award 
fee pool will be distributed at different times, in different manners.  
The incentive fee is based on how well the contractor’s target cost matches 
the contract’s actual costs.  If the contract’s actual cost is the same as the target 
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cost, then the contractor will receive the entire incentive fee.  Using Figure 12 as an 
example, the contractor would receive the entire $1,843 if the target cost and the 
actual cost were both $34,000. If the actual cost ended up lower than the target cost, 
then the contractor would receive the entire incentive pool plus a portion of every 
dollar that the actual cost was lower than the target cost. The equation that 
represents the incentive fee function is:  
F = I + S (T-A)  
where:  
F = Actual incentive fee earned by the contractor,  
I = Target Incentive Fee,  
S = Share ratio,  
T = Target cost, and  
A = Actual cost  
Using Figure 12 as an example, if the actual contract cost is $33,000 and the 
contractor’s target cost was $34,000, then the contractor would earn the entire target 
incentive fee ($1,843) plus their share (.439) of the $1,000 under-run ( $1,000 x .439 
= $439).  This gives the contractor an actual incentive fee of $2,282.  
If the actual cost is greater than the target cost, then the contractor’s actual 
incentive fee would be the target incentive fee minus the contractor’s share of the 
over-run (if A > T in the formula above, T – A < 0).  Using Figure 12 as an example, 
if the actual contract cost was $36,000 and the contractor’s target cost was $34,000, 
then the contractor would earn the target incentive fee ($1,843) minus their share of 
the over-run ($2,000 x .439 = $878). In this case, the contractor would earn an 
actual incentive fee of $965 ($1,843 – $878 = $965).  
The problem with incentive fees is that you cannot determine actual costs 
until the end of the contract when the product/service has been delivered and the 
contract has been closed. Waiting until contract closeout can be too long a wait for a 
contractor to receive fees. Therefore, incentive fee payments should be made 
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throughout the duration of the contract based on estimations of how the contractor is 
controlling costs.  For example, the contractor should submit cost vouchers to 
recoup their actual costs of labor, materials, etc., throughout the duration of the cost-
reimbursement contract.  The contracting officer should award incentive fees based 
on the percentage of costs.  For example, if the contractor submits a cost voucher 
for 10% of the contract value, then 10% of the target incentive fee should be up for 
consideration. The contracting officer should use earned value management data, 
specifically the cost performance index, to determine the portion of the accrued 
target incentive fee to award the contractor.  For example, a contractor has selected 
a contract from the TRIM contract menu with a target cost of $34,000, a share ratio 
of 0.439, and a target fee of $4,607.  Of that target fee, $1,843 is dedicated to the 
target incentive fee pool. If the contractor submits a cost reimbursement voucher for 
10% of the contract value ($3,400), then 10% of the award fee pool should be 
considered for determination ($184).  If the current earned value management data 
states that the actual costs are aligned with the budgeted costs (the cost 
performance index is 1.00), then the contracting officer should award the full 10% of 
the target incentive fee pool ($184).  
Remember, these interim incentive fee payments awarded to the contractor 
are only estimates.  Once the contract is closed out and actual costs can be 
determined, the incentive fee awarded should be adjusted accordingly.  If the 
contractor’s incentive fee payments exceed what they have actually earned, then the 
contractor will need to return the overpayment to the Government.  
4. Administering the Award Fee  
The award fee is a subjective incentive that a contractor may earn in its 
entirety or in part during contract performance.  The award fee portion of the overall 
target fee is intended to incentivize the contractor for performance areas outside of 
cost such as quality, schedule, and technical performance.  The contracting officer 
should work with all acquisition stakeholders to determine which areas of contractor 
performance, outside of cost control, need incentivizing.  
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The step-by-step instructions on how to set-up an award-fee plan are highly 
involved and outside the scope of this user’s guide.  Refer to your Government 
agencies’ instructions on award fee to determine how to properly set-up the award 
fee portion of the overall target fee. If your agency does not have an award fee 
guide, our suggested reference is the Department of the Air Force Award Fee Guide, 
located in the AT&L Knowledge-sharing System of the Defense Acquisition 
University website (https://akss.dau.mil/Lists/Guidebooks%20%20Handbooks/). 
5. The Relationship between the Incentive and Award Fees When Using 
the TRIM  
For the TRIM to create truth-revealing incentives, the incentive fee pool and 
the award fee pool must be tied together.  The contractor’s share of a cost over-run 
can eat away both the cost incentive and award fee pool.  The TRIM mechanism is 
based on the total target fee and the contractor-sharing ratio.  Even though we have 
divided the total fee into a cost incentive pool and an award fee pool to incentivized 
areas other than cost, the contractor share ratio is tied to the total target fee; if the 
cost over-run is large enough, then it depletes both pools.  
The contract should be structured so any cost over-run is subtracted from the 
incentive fee portion of the total fee first.  If the cost over-run is so large that it 
eliminates the entire cost incentive fee, then the cost over-run must be subtracted 
from the award fee pool. On the other hand, if the contractor is under-running the 
contract, then all additional fees are awarded as part of the incentive fee pool, not 
the award fee pool.  Adding the contractor under-run fees to the award fee pool 
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